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ARTICLES
AGAINST SHAMING:
PRESERVING DIGNITY, DECENCY, AND A
MORAL-EDUCATIVE MISSION IN
AMERICAN SCHOOLS
AMANDA HARMON COOLEY†
“Nam ego illum periisse duco, cui quidem periit pudor.”1
INTRODUCTION
In Clayton County, Georgia, D.H., a twelve-year-old seventh
grader, was suspected of possessing marijuana and was then
subjected to an invasively shaming strip search.2 The school’s
assistant principal conducted the strip search in the view of the
school resource officer and three of D.H.’s peers.3 When stripped
to his underwear, D.H. requested that the search continue in the
restroom; this request was denied.4
A reviewing court
determined that the school administrator then instructed D.H. to
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Jasmine Plott for their research assistance.
1
TITUS MACCIUS PLAUTUS, BACCHIDES act 3, sc. 3, line 80.
2
See Dawson ex rel. D.H. v. Clayton Cty. Sch. Dist., 830 F.3d 1306, 1308, 1312
(11th Cir. 2016). In holding the search to be unconstitutionally excessive, the
Eleventh Circuit emphasized its shaming nature: “We have no doubt that a fully
nude strip search in the presence of one’s peers would exponentially intensify the
‘embarrass[ment], fright[], and humiliati[on]’ a student experiences when
undergoing a strip search.” Id. at 1317 (alteration in original) (quoting Safford
Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 374–75 (2009)).
3
See id. at 1311–12 (describing the witnesses to the strip search).
4
See id. at 1312.
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pull his underpants down to his ankles and stand completely
nude while the search was completed.5 The search yielded no
marijuana or other illegal contraband.6
In Smithfield, Utah, a high school football player, Brian
Seamons, was brutally assaulted by four of his teammates who
bound him naked to a locker room towel rack with athletic tape
and then displayed him to a former girlfriend.7 After reporting
the hazing assault to school authorities and the police, Brian was
informed by his coach that the assailants would not face any
disciplinary action.8 Instead, Brian was disciplined by the coach,
who told him that he would be required to apologize to the team
for reporting the assault in order to continue to play football.9
When Brian refused to comply with this shaming sanction, he
was removed from the team.10
On her third day at a Clay County, Florida high school,
fifteen-year-old Miranda Larkin wore a skirt that was less than
one inch shorter than the dress code permitted.11 Students who
violate the dress code of that high school are provided three
options: attending in-school suspension while wearing the
noncompliant clothing, arranging for someone to bring them a
new set of compliant clothes, or wearing the school’s dress code
“shame suit.”12 Miranda maintains she was only given the last
option.13 The school-mandated outfit was an ill-fitting, neon
yellow T-shirt and a pair of scarlet red sweatpants, with the
words “DRESS CODE VIOLATION” emblazoned across the chest

5
See id. (making factual assumptions in the light most favorable to the
student).
6
Id.
7
See Seamons v. Snow, 206 F.3d 1021, 1023 (10th Cir. 2000) (describing the
incident).
8
Id.
9
See id. at 1024.
10
Id.
11
See Gail Sullivan, New Kid at School Forced To Wear ‘Shame Suit’ for Dress
Code Violation, WASH. POST (Sept. 5, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/morning-mix/wp/2014/09/05/new-kid-at-school-forced-to-wear-shame-suit-for-dresscode-violation/?utm_term=.8843d9a98e53.
12
See Eliza Murphy, Student Forced To Wear ‘Shame Suit’ for Dress Code
Violation, ABC NEWS (Sept. 4, 2014, 5:43 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/US/student-fo
rced-wear-shame-suit-dress-code-violation/story?id=25252041.
13
Id.
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of the shirt and the leg of the pants.14 After changing into the
outfit, Miranda broke out in hives.15 In reference to the
punishment, Miranda claims “ ‘[t]he school . . . said this is to
embarrass you’ . . . . ‘It’s supposed to embarrass you so you don’t
do it again.’ ”16
In response to six-year-old Kai Shappley’s request to the
Pearland Independent School District in Texas to use the girls’
restroom as a reflection of her gender identity, she was informed
that she could only use the boys’ restroom or the nurse’s
restroom.17 As a result of this “othering” via either mandated use
of a restroom that did not reflect her gender identity or of a
segregated restroom that other children did not use, Kai felt
stigmatized.18 Subsequently, this shaming was intensified when
Pearland Independent School District Superintendent Dr. John
Kelly provided the following statement to the local newspaper
that criticized Obama Administration guidance directives that
Title IX generally requires schools to treat transgender students
according to their gender identity:
[T]his is one more example of unconstitutional interference and
social engineering by the federal government . . . . What’s next?
Legalizing pedophilia and polygamy? Unless we return to the
Biblical basis on which our nation’s laws were established, we
are in serious trouble—and cannot expect God’s continued
favor.19

14

Sullivan, supra note 11 (describing the shame suit). The parallels between the
shame suit and Nathaniel Hawthorne’s Scarlet Letter are obvious. See NATHANIEL
HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER 53 (Barnes & Noble Books 1993) (1892) (“On the
breast of her gown, in fine red cloth, surrounded with an elaborate embroidery and
fantastic flourishes of gold thread, appeared the letter A.”).
15
See Sullivan, supra note 11.
16
Madeline Roth, This Girl Was Forced To Wear a ‘Shame Suit’ on Her Third
Day at a New School, MTV NEWS (Sept. 6, 2014), http://www.mtv.com/news/192
2772/miranda-larkin-shame-suit-dress-code-violation.
17
See Emily McCombs, Christian, Conservative and Parenting a Transgender
Child in Texas, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 2, 2017, 5:18 PM), http://www.huffing
tonpost.com/entry/kimberly-and-kai-shappley-transgender-child-bathroomrights_us_58b5b5b6e4b060480e0c4393?39rg4x6r&.
18
See id.
19
Jim Molony, Districts Unfazed by ‘Bathroom Guidance,’ HOUS. CHRON. (May
17, 2016, 3:53 AM), http://www.chron.com/neighborhood/pearland/news/article/Dist
ricts-unfazed-by-bathroom-guidance-9770204.php.

FINAL_COOLEY

796

6/16/2018 11:11 AM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91:793

Throughout America, public schoolchildren are being
disciplined by shaming for alleged violations of school rules and
community norms.20
These disciplinary measures penalize
student conduct by degrading the student in an intentionally
public way and by exposing the child to condemnation from the
school community.21 School-shaming punishments include all
forms of “scolding, rebuking, ridiculing, scorning, avoiding, and
shunning . . . .”22 Specific examples of these shaming sanctions
are strip searches, forced apologies, dress code violation
punishments, and transgender student restroom access denials.23
Despite their divergent forms, these shaming punishments share
a common disintegrative variable: the stigmatization of the
student by fellow students, teachers, and administrators.24
Consequently, educational shaming is a burgeoning issue
that requires scholarly and policy attention.25 While there has
been an extensive amount of scholarly discourse regarding the
propriety of shaming as a criminal sanction,26 there has been
almost no critical discussion about the validity of shaming
punishments as disciplinary measures in schools.27 This Article
20
See Geoffrey P. Miller, The Legal Function of Ritual, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1181, 1183 (2005) (discussing how norms are compelled through shaming); Amy L.
Wax, Caring Enough: Sex Roles, Work and Taxing Women, 44 VILL. L. REV. 495, 500
(1999) (same); Kerrin Wolf, Mary Kate Kalinich & Susan L. DeJarnatt, Charting
School Discipline, 48 URB. LAW. 1, 40–41 (2016) (discussing examples of K-12 schoolshaming punishments).
21
See Dan Markel, Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive?
Retributivism and the Implications for the Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54 VAND. L.
REV. 2157, 2162–63 (2001) [hereinafter Markel, Shaming Punishments] (noting the
public nature and public participation elements of shaming punishments).
22
Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, Fear and Loathing: Shame, Shaming, and
Intellectual Property, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 8 (2013).
23
See, e.g., supra notes 1–19 and accompanying text.
24
See JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 55 (1989)
(defining disintegrative shaming as an intense condemnation of the punished that
creates community division and a class of outcasts).
25
See Christopher R. Green, Punishing Corporations: The Food-Chain
Schizophrenia in Punitive Damages and Criminal Law, 87 NEB. L. REV. 197, 266
n.304 (2008) (noting how shaming is not uniquely a criminal law issue).
26
See Yuval Feldman & Doron Teichman, Are All Legal Probabilities Created
Equal?, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 980, 993–94 (2009) (discussing how an increased
“recognition of the importance of social controls” has contributed to the expansive
scholarly literature regarding criminal shaming).
27
See Amanda Harmon Cooley, An Efficacy Examination and Constitutional
Critique of School Shaming, 79 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2018) (discussing the
paucity of legal scholarship on educational shaming).
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is designed to initiate this needed dialogue by arguing for the
cessation of school shaming through a legal theory lenses. To
accomplish this objective, Part I of this Article provides a
definitional foundation of shaming punishments.28 Part II of the
Article presents the normative rejection of school shaming, which
is grounded in both legal punishment theory and educational
theory.29 It provides a philosophical extrapolation of the rejection
of shaming sanctions in the criminal law context to the education
law context, highlighting the analytical division between the
perspectives on criminal shaming held by Dan Kahan, Martha
Nussbaum, Toni Massaro, Dan Markel, Stephen Garvey, Eric
Posner, and James Whitman.30 That Part advocates for the
termination of school shaming based on the tenets of dignity,
decency, and moral-educative mission that have been at the core
of critiques of shaming punishments in criminal law and that are
central pedagogical goals and civic aims of the American K-12
educational system.31 Finally, Part II concludes this argument
by calling for a rejection of school-shaming punishments in order
to make schools communities of respect, rather than communities
of stigma.32
A liberal democratic society demands this
preservation of dignity and decency be part of the moraleducative mission of its public schools for children.
I.

A FOUNDATIONAL DEFINITION OF SHAMING

All punishments express condemnation of a behavior
through the imposition of a negative experience.33 However,
state-sponsored shaming punishments are punishments that are
targeted to humiliate and degrade the offender with a public,

28

See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.B.
30
See infra Part II.C.
31
See Christine N. Coughlin et al., See One, Do One, Teach One: Dissecting the
Use of Medical Education’s Signature Pedagogy in the Law School Curriculum, 26
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 361, 393–94 (2010) (arguing student shaming does not result in
positive learning outcomes); Saira Mohamed, Shame in the Security Council, 90
WASH. U. L. REV. 1191, 1204 (2013) (discussing how shaming invokes equivalent
moral and legal obligations).
32
See infra Conclusion.
33
See John Bronsteen et al., Retribution and the Experience of Punishment, 98
CALIF. L. REV. 1463, 1469 (2010) (outlining the communicative and experiential
aspects of punishment).
29
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expressive communication that the individual is inferior.34
Consequently, shaming is inherently stigmatic.35 The term
“stigma” originates from the Greek practice of cutting or burning
symbols into the body, which was designed to expose the
unsavory moral status of the inflicted individual.36 These rituals
designated the individual as “polluted, to be avoided, especially
in public places.”37 Erving Goffman analyzed this concept of
stigma in the context of shaming as a sociological phenomenon
that subordinates and dehumanizes people.38
This shaming subordination of the punished individual often
results in pariah status.39 As Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry
detailed, “To be a pariah is to be shunned and isolated, to be
treated as if one had a loathsome and contagious disease.”40 This
idea that outcasts are inferior and that “contact with them is
dangerous and degrading”41 dovetails with Professor Goffman’s
perspective that stigmatized people are deemed to be and
subsequently viewed as subhuman.42
State imposition of
pariahdom and its resulting dehumanization of the shamed
individual are “profoundly subversive of the ideas of equality and
dignity on which liberal society is based.”43

34
Markel, Shaming Punishments, supra note 21, at 2162–63 (defining the
essential nature of shaming punishments).
35
See David Wolitz, The Stigma of Conviction: Coram Nobis, Civil Disabilities,
and the Right To Clear One’s Name, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1277, 1310 (connecting
shaming and stigmatization).
36
See ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED
IDENTITY 1 (1963).
37
Id.
38
Id. at 5.
39
See John Braithwaite, Holism, Justice, and Atonement, 2003 UTAH L. REV.
389, 409 (implying that non-restorative shaming results in stigmatization and
pariah status).
40
Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST.
COMMENT. 257, 266 (1996).
41
Id.
42
GOFFMAN, supra note 36, at 5.
43
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE
LAW 232 (2004).
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Despite its marked subversion of democratic ideals, shaming
has deep roots in global and American history.44 Over the last
thirty years, shaming has experienced a modern resurgence in
the criminal law context as an alternative or a corollary
punishment to fines and imprisonment for convicted criminal
defendants.45 Analogously, many public schools now use shaming
punishments as alternative or corollary punishments to corporal
or exclusionary punishments.46 School shaming has become
increasingly punitive, which is reflective of a recent, “massive
and troubling intensification of American punitiveness.”47 This
disciplinary approach that injects the punitive constructs of
criminal alternative sanctions into school environments is a
malignancy that needs intense critical examination and,
ultimately, excision in order to safeguard American
schoolchildren and the core tenets of the American educational
system.
II. A PHILOSOPHICAL REJECTION OF SCHOOL SHAMING
A philosophical critique of school shaming forms a solid
foundation for the rejection of these sanctions in public schools.
This rejection is premised upon an extrapolation of the law and
theory rejection of shaming punishments in criminal law onto
school law.48 This comparison utilizes the bases of dignity,
decency, and a moral-educative mission as foundational shared
criticisms of criminal shaming, as these core principles also
44
See Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 625,
664 (discussing how shaming can be traced back to biblical times); Jonathan Turley,
Congress as Grand Jury: The Role of the House of Representatives in the
Impeachment of an American President, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 735, 783 (1999)
(noting how American colonists readily used shaming punishments); W. Bradley
Wendel, Nonlegal Regulation of the Legal Profession: Social Norms in Professional
Communities, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1955, 1977 (2001) (discussing historical and
contemporaneous examples of state-imposed shaming).
45
See, e.g., Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89
MICH. L. REV. 1880, 1884–85 (1991) [hereinafter Massaro, Shame, Culture] (“The
revival of [criminal] shaming springs from profound and widespread dissatisfaction
with existing methods of punishment.”); James Q. Whitman, Making Happy
Punishers, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2698, 2716 (2005) [hereinafter Whitman, Making
Happy Punishers] (reviewing NUSSBAUM, supra note 43).
46
See, e.g., supra notes 1–24 and accompanying text (detailing a variety of
school-shaming punishments).
47
Whitman, Making Happy Punishers, supra note 45, at 2716–17.
48
See infra Part II.A.
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constitute focal points of the pedagogical goals and civic aims of
education of children in American schools.49 Because schoolshaming punishments contradict these foundational tenets of
dignity, decency, and an educative mission, analogical
connections to shaming punishments imposed in the criminal
justice system support a valid framework to attack the
imposition of shaming of schoolchildren.50 The normative goals of
this Article are to use this framework (1) to generate the type of
robust dialogue that has been present in a philosophical rejection
of criminal shaming punishments for educational shaming
punishments and (2) to argue that the view of scholars who
advocate for the cessation of criminal shaming punishments is
the proper view in the education law context. Consequently, this
argument will conclude that disintegrative school-shaming
punishments are not an appropriate tool for state discipline and
control of schoolchildren.51
A.

The Extrapolation of Critical Analysis of Criminal Shaming
to the Critical Analysis of School Shaming

The parallels between state control in the criminal justice
system and in K-12 schools justify an extrapolation of the
rejection of shaming sanctions in criminal law to education law.52
A foundational analogue between educational shaming
punishments and criminal shaming punishments has been their
development as an alternative to exclusionary and corporal
punishments.53 The critical debate on shaming in criminal law
49

See infra Part II.B.
The application of such an analogical foundation is not without precedent in
other areas of legal scholarship. See, e.g., Kate Klonick, Re-Shaming the Debate:
Social Norms, Shame, and Regulation in an Internet Age, 75 MD. L. REV. 1029, 1037
(2016) (using the criminal shaming debate as a foundational framework to discuss
shaming in cyberlaw).
51
It is offered in a similar vein as Professor Dan Markel’s critiques of criminal
shaming, as “a project in philosophy, law, and ultimately, social hope.” Markel,
Shaming Punishments, supra note 21, at 2241.
52
See, e.g., Mashburn v. Yamhill County, 698 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1238 (D. Or.
2010) (discussing the “unique concerns of children and of the government, which
have analogies in both prisons and schools . . . .”); Barbara Fedders, The AntiPipeline Collaborative, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 565, 569 (2016) (arguing school
discipline “incorporates the retributive underpinnings of criminal law”).
53
See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Natural Law and Lawlessness: Modern Lessons
from Pirates, Lepers, Eskimos, and Survivors, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 433, 486
(discussing the imposition of shaming penalties as an alternative to incarceration);
50
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was spurred by the pursuit for alternative or corollary
punishments to incarceration,54 which excludes individuals from
participation in free society.55 Likewise, the application of this
philosophical debate to educational shaming punishments serves
as the jumping-off point of evaluating the propriety of shaming
punishments as alternative or corollary punishments to
suspension or expulsion from school, which exclude students
from the school community.56
Additionally, the rejection of shaming in criminal law can be
translated to a corresponding rejection of shaming in education
law, because as a baseline, children in schools should not be
subject to the types of shaming punishments inflicted by adult
and institutional state actors on adult criminal offenders and
incarcerated prisoners.57 The United States Supreme Court in
New Jersey v. T.L.O. stated that it was “not yet ready to hold
that the schools and the prisons need be equated for purposes of
the Fourth Amendment,” implying that students should have at
least more rights than those of prisoners in the context of
government searches.58 This notion aligns with other Supreme
Court articulations that the risk of harm is greater for children
than adults in settings of possible constitutional criminal
Doron Teichman, The Market for Criminal Justice: Federalism, Crime Control, and
Jurisdictional Competition, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1831, 1860 (2005) (articulating the
view that criminal shaming is innovative compared to other forms of criminal
punishment).
54
See, e.g., Kaaryn Gustafson, Degradation Ceremonies and the Criminalization
of Low-Income Women, 3 UC IRVINE L. REV. 297, 311 (2013) (discussing the “scholars
who have argued that certain types of shaming might be more effective, more just,
and less costly than incarceration”); Susan R. Klein, Independent-Norm Federalism
in Criminal Law, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1541, 1557 (2002) (discussing the alternatives—
including shaming—states have used instead of incarceration for criminal
violations).
55
See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 669 (1977) (“The
prisoner’s . . . incarceration deprives [her or] him of the freedom ‘to be with family
and friends and to form the other enduring attachments of normal life.’ ”) (quoting
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)).
56
See supra notes 1–24 and accompanying text (detailing a variety of schoolshaming punishments).
57
See NUSSBAUM, supra note 43, at 211 (noting that because “children are in
general more labile than adults, . . . special care needs to be taken over the use of
shame in their case”); Aaron H. Caplan, Freedom of Speech in School and Prison, 85
WASH. L. REV. 71, 105 (2010) (discussing the dangerous consequences of judicial
equations of constitutional protections between schoolchildren and adults and
advocating for the termination of such equations).
58
469 U.S. 325, 338–39 (1985).
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procedure violations.59 Therefore, if the correct view of criminal
shaming sanctions is that they are not appropriate disciplinary
mechanisms for adults in the criminal justice system, then that
view is only magnified in supporting the end to their use on
children in K-12 schools.
B.

The Philosophical Rejection of Shaming in Criminal Law

In 1940, Columbia Law Professor Herbert Wechsler,60 who
initiated and framed the American Law Institute’s Model Penal
Code,61 and his colleague Jerome Michael wrote in their
influential criminal law casebook that “the desire for revenge, the
belief that retributive punishment is just, and the feeling that
examples must be made of those guilty of shocking crimes are to
a very considerable degree entrenched in the general
population.”62 The debate over the propriety of retribution’s role
in American criminal law and theory has continued since the
publication of the Michael-Wechsler book,63 which was one of the
first to incorporate social values into legal practice.64 Due to
increasing academic and political support of principles of

59
See, e.g., J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 269, 273 (2011) (discussing
how the risks of false confessions in custodial interrogations are “more troubling”
and “more acute” for juvenile suspects as compared to adult suspects based on the
differences in maturity and responsibility between children and adults).
60
See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, In Memory of Herbert Wechsler, 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 1359, 1359 (2000) (discussing Professor Wechsler’s career).
61
See George P. Fletcher, The Nature and Function of Criminal Theory, 88
CALIF. L. REV. 687, 688 (2000) (outlining the origins of the Model Penal Code).
62
JEROME MICHAEL & HERBERT WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
ADMINISTRATION: CASES, STATUTES AND COMMENTARIES 16 (1940).
63
See Sol Rubin, The Law Schools and the Law of Sentencing and Correctional
Treatment, 43 TEX. L. REV. 332, 337–38 (1965) (discussing the groundbreaking
nature of the casebook); see also Anders Walker, American Oresteia: Herbert
Wechsler, the Model Penal Code, and the Uses of Revenge, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 1017,
1018 (denoting criticism of the American Law Institute’s 2007 revisions regarding
retribution).
64
See Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Legal Education and Public
Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203, 245 (1943)
(discussing the casebook’s paradigmatic nature with its explicit organization of
social values as an application of legal practice).
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retribution and an environment of popular punitiveness,65 there
has been a renaissance of shaming punishments in criminal law,
which has enlivened the debate in the contemporary context.66
This spirited dialogue regarding the validity of criminal
shaming punishments was largely initiated by Dan Kahan in his
1996 article, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?67 In this
article, Professor Kahan advocated for shaming in criminal law
as a better alternative to exclusionary imprisonment,68 rejecting
along the way the “barely conceivable” alternative of corporal
punishment69 and emphasizing the necessity of connections of
criminal punishments with social norms.70 Kahan’s seminal
article endorses shaming punishments as they effectively
“express appropriate moral condemnation,”71 they “denounce the
wrongdoer and his [or her] conduct as contrary to shared moral
norms,”72 and they “ritualistically separate the wrongdoer from
those who subscribe to such norms.”73 However, Professor Kahan
acknowledges the stigmatizing harm of shaming penalties,74 their
cruel nature,75 and their potential to gain hierarchical meaning
when focused on traditionally socially marginalized groups of
people.76 Still, under his criminal punishment theory calculus,
Kahan’s assessment concludes that shaming sanctions are a
valid form of criminal discipline.77
65
See Donald Braman, Punishment and Accountability: Understanding and
Reforming Criminal Sanctions in America, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1143, 1188 (2006)
(quoting Jonathan Simon, Sanctioning Government: Explaining America’s Severity
Revolution, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 217, 219 (2001)) (“Cruelty and pain, long treated as
inappropriate ends of public policy, are steadily making inroads into the discourse
and practice of punishment.”).
66
See Deborah Ahrens, Note, Not in Front of the Children: Prohibition on Child
Custody as Civil Branding for Criminal Activity, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 737, 750 (2000)
(discussing the resurgence of criminal shaming).
67
Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591,
594 (1996) [hereinafter Kahan, Alternative Sanctions].
68
See id. at 652 (identifying shaming penalties as a feasible alternative criminal
sanction).
69
Id. at 591.
70
See id. at 593.
71
Id. at 635.
72
Id. at 636.
73
Id.
74
See id. at 638.
75
See id. at 646.
76
See id. at 647–48.
77
See id. at 652.
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Professor Kahan’s article set off a critical firestorm
regarding the propriety of criminal shaming punishments.78 The
critiques of criminal shaming draw from a diverse range of
theoretical justifications.79 Broadly construed, these critiques
can be situated in ideals of dignity, decency, and moral-educative
mission.80 The lack of fulfillment of each of these ideals
undercuts the legitimacy of the state’s use of shaming
punishments for adult criminal offenders.81
1.

Dignity

One major critique of criminal shaming punishments is that
their inherent stigma menaces and eradicates individual
dignity.82 Martha Nussbaum and Toni Massaro are leading
opponents of criminal shaming based on the perspective that it is
offensive to human dignity.83 Under Professor Nussbaum’s view,
“law should protect the equal dignity of all citizens, both by
devising ways in which those already stigmatized as different can
enjoy lives of greater dignity and by refusing to make law a
partner to the social infliction of shame.”84 However, as Toni
Massaro argues, “[s]tate-enforced shaming authorizes public
officials to search for and destroy or damage an offender’s
dignity.”85
Professor Nussbaum emphasizes how shaming
punishments degrade the civic democratic ideals of dignity and

78
See Dan M. Kahan, What’s Really Wrong with Shaming Sanctions, 84 TEX. L.
REV. 2075, 2079 (2006) [hereinafter Kahan, Shaming Sanctions] (admitting that his
previous article “provoked a torrent of criticism”); Markel, Shaming Punishments,
supra note 21, at 2162 (discussing the intense critical controversy regarding criminal
shaming).
79
See NUSSBAUM, supra note 43, at 4 (“Nor do opponents of shaming penalties
agree about what the best rationale for opposition is.”).
80
See infra Part II.B.1–3.
81
See, e.g., Michael Tonry, Rethinking Unthinkable Punishment Policies in
America, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1751, 1764–71 (1999) (discussing the lack of legitimacy of
criminal shaming punishments on the bases of dignity, decency, and moraleducative mission).
82
See Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L.
REV. 733, 739 (1998) [hereinafter Garvey, Shaming Punishments] (discussing the
menacing effect on dignity of criminal shaming punishments).
83
See, e.g., NUSSBAUM, supra note 43, at 230 (emphasizing the invalidity of
criminal shaming due to dignitary concerns); Massaro, Shame, Culture, supra note
45, at 1943 (rejecting criminal shaming because it offends human dignity).
84
NUSSBAUM, supra note 43, at 174.
85
Massaro, Shame, Culture, supra note 45, at 1943.
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equality86 and, echoing Professor Goffman,87 how this
degradation results in the denigration of the shamed individual’s
basic humanity.88
Another dignity-based critique of criminal shaming
concentrates on the harmful permanence of stripping away
dignity. For example, Professor Markel’s critical rejection of
shaming punishments focuses on their significant reputational
damage to individual dignity, likening them to “reputational
homicide”89 and criticizing Professor Kahan’s advocacy of a
“punishment that effectively ends the life of the offender by
taking away all his [or her] dignity.”90 Also echoing Professor
Goffman, Professor Markel’s definition of shaming punishments
displays their inherently negative nature: “When one shames
another person, the goal is to degrade the object of shame, to
place him [or her] lower in the chain of being, to dehumanize him
[or her],”91 and “to express to the public that this offender is a bad
person.”92
Professor Markel’s scholarship highlights how
shaming punishments “make[] the offender an instrument of the
state; [she or] he is being used (even if indirectly) for display
purposes rather than being treated as someone possessing the
basic dignity that attaches to a responsible moral agent.”93
Professor Nussbaum also spends considerable time describing
the harm of stigmatizing shaming punishments, which includes
legal and civil disabilities, long-term individual collateral
consequences, and the permanent pain from the loss of dignity
that occurs intrinsically with shaming.94
In sum, these
punishments destroy the potential for the punished individual to
ever again be recognized as having basic human dignity.95

86

See NUSSBAUM, supra note 43, at 226.
See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
88
See NUSSBAUM, supra note 43, at 232.
89
Markel, Shaming Punishments, supra note 21, at 2220.
90
Id. at 2174 n.84.
91
Id. at 2179.
92
Dan Markel, Wrong Turns on the Road to Alternative Sanctions: Reflections
on the Future of Shaming Punishments and Restorative Justice, 85 TEX. L. REV.
1385, 1390 n.25 (2007) [hereinafter Markel, Wrong Turns].
93
Markel, Shaming Punishments, supra note 21, at 2219.
94
See NUSSBAUM, supra note 43, at 225.
95
See Markel, Shaming Punishments, supra note 21, at 2220 (emphasizing the
permanence of dignitary harm with criminal shaming).
87
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James Whitman, another opponent of shaming sanctions,
focuses his critique of these punishments on the claim that they
violate transactional or marketplace dignity, due to their reliance
on the inherently unpredictable community to participate in the
shaming process.96 Specifically, Professor Whitman argues that
“[s]ubjecting offenders to the public’s unpredictable response to
shame sanctions is a violation of our modern sense of what we
might call transactional dignity. It is a deeply rooted norm of our
society that persons should never be forced to deal with wild or
This scholarship argues that
unpredictable partners.”97
harshness is a certain consequence of shaming sanctions, as they
require privately-inflicted sanctions, which are per se violative of
the punished individual’s dignity.98
This quadrumvirate of legal scholars provides a deeply
persuasive argument against the validity of criminal shaming
punishments based on the claim that they are antithetical to the
value of human dignity. By highlighting the permanently
deleterious impact of this loss of dignity on both an individual
and transactional level, the dignitary opposition to criminal
shaming sanctions argues that these punishments are violative
of the true social norms of a civic democracy. Consequently, this
dignity critique of criminal shaming punishments strongly
supports the termination of their use in the U.S. criminal justice
system.
2.

Decency

Criminal shaming punishments have also been criticized in
terms of their lack of decency99—essentially, that a decent state
should not inflict punishments that eradicate individual
dignity100 and that shaming punishments fail “the litmus test of

96

See James Q. Whitman, Essay, What is Wrong with Inflicting Shame
Sanctions?, 107 YALE L.J. 1055, 1090 (1998) [hereinafter Whitman, Shame
Sanctions].
97
Id. (emphasis in original).
98
See id. (deeming harshness an inevitable byproduct of shaming punishments).
99
Critics in this camp set a low bar on what constitutes decency. See, e.g.,
James Q. Whitman, Enforcing Civility and Respect: Three Societies, 109 YALE L.J.
1279, 1289 (2000) (“[R]ules of decency speak, as a general matter, to problems in
differentiating the human from the bestial.”).
100
See Garvey, Shaming Punishments, supra note 82, at 758 (“[S]haming
penalties violate an offender’s dignity, which no morally decent state should do.”).
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the decent society.”101 Although this critique is related to the
first critique of dignity,102 its primary focus is not on the
individual being punished, but instead upon the punisher and
the larger society’s degradation as a result of shaming
punishments.103 As Professor Markel’s scholarship emphasizes,
“shaming sanctions encourage a practice that inevitably coarsens
our sensitivity to the dignity of other persons, and thus,
ourselves.”104 This erosion of dignity commensurately erodes the
essential decency of society.105 A decent state should not engage
in punishment practices that allow this erosion to occur.106
Eric Posner articulates another decency critique that builds
upon this connection to dignity in its concern for the normalizing
effect of shaming and how it incites an unacceptable urge to
degrade through the exploitation of crowd dynamics.107 As
Professor Massaro also points out, “[t]he decency concern is based
on the sense that shaming may be cruel and that normalizing
cruelty may encourage its proliferation . . . .”108
The
communicative stigmatic effect of shaming punishments, which

101

AVISHAI MARGALIT, THE DECENT SOCIETY 262 (Naomi Goldblum trans.,

1996).
102
See NUSSBAUM, supra note 43, at 223 (“A decent society . . . would treat its
citizens with respect for their human dignity, rather than degrading or humiliating
them. A decent society would also protect its citizens from at least some types of
degradation or humiliation.”).
103
See, e.g., Markel, Shaming Punishments, supra note 21, at 2176 (noting how
some punishments degrade both the punished and the punishers); Toni M. Massaro,
The Meanings of Shame: Implications for Legal Reform, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L.
645, 702 (1997) [hereinafter Massaro, Shame Implications] (discussing the primacy
“of preserving the community’s commitment to decency, not preserving the offender’s
dignity per se” with this critique of shaming).
104
Markel, Shaming Punishments, supra note 21, at 2220.
105
See Massaro, Shame Implications, supra note 103, at 649 (arguing that
criminal shaming irreparably damages social norms of decency through the
degradation of individual dignity).
106
See MARGALIT, supra note 101, at 1 (asserting humiliation should not be an
institutional practice of a decent society).
107
See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 106 (2000) (deeming shaming
punishments to be “messy” as “[t]hey are intended to exploit the independent force of
crowd dynamics, but crowd dynamics are unpredictable”).
108
Massaro, Shame Implications, supra note 103, at 699.
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demarks the subhuman status of criminal offenders109 and which
often snowballs with its dissemination to the public,110 does not
jibe with a decent, egalitarian political state.111
Building upon this latter analysis, another decency critique
emphasizes how shaming punishments are unacceptable because
they incite the potential for a state-initiated, uncontrollable mob
mentality.112 Professor Whitman centers his primary rejection of
shaming punishments on this aspect, stating that “[t]he chief evil
in public humiliation sanctions is that they involve an ugly, and
politically dangerous, complicity between the state and the
crowd” and deeming them “a peculiarly disturbing . . . species of
official lynch justice.”113 Therefore, Whitman’s concern with
shaming sanctions is that once the state initiates them, it no
longer has the ability to control the manner in which the public
will treat the punished individual.114 Professor Nussbaum shares
this concern about the loss of control with shaming punishments:
“Shaming behavior is not to be easily trusted, or taken at face
value. It can easily get out of control, and it will be difficult both
to keep it tethered to genuinely valuable norms and to calibrate
it properly.”115 This state-initiated devolution of control through
the public’s infliction of shaming as a punishment certainly
conflicts with notions of decency in society, as they indicate the
government’s perilous willingness “to delegate part of its
enforcement power to a fickle and uncontrolled general
populace.”116 This can lead to an interminable punishment,
which lacks “any redemptive, dues-paid end point.”117 Clearly, a

109
See GOFFMAN, supra note 36, at 5 (analyzing the subordination and
stigmatization of the shamed).
110
See POSNER, supra note 107, at 95 (noting the problem of shaming is “that
the government cannot control the level of ostracism it provokes”).
111
See Massaro, Shame Implications, supra note 103, at 700 (arguing shaming
punishments are, “and should be, jarring in a political order that makes equality a
cultural baseline”).
112
See Robinson, supra note 53, at 485 (discussing how shaming opponents have
an especial concern with “the chance of incidents of vigilantism against shamed
defendants, which they believe promote a spirit of public indecency and brutality”).
113
Whitman, Shame Sanctions, supra note 96, at 1059.
114
See id. at 1088. Professor Posner is likewise troubled by this aspect of
shaming penalties. See POSNER, supra note 107, at 106.
115
NUSSBAUM, supra note 43, at 220.
116
Whitman, Shame Sanctions, supra note 96, at 1088.
117
Massaro, Shame Implications, supra note 103, at 694.
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decent state should not inflict shaming punishments that last in
perpetuity; however, this critical view advances this very
potentiality as a basis for their rejection.118
Additionally, there is a proportionality and efficacy critique
of shaming that revolves around decency.119 As Stephen Garvey
articulates, “Insofar as shaming penalties, unlike fines and
imprisonment, are intended to make an offender’s actual
emotional response a part of the severity of the sanction, they
make the proportionality calculus much more difficult, increasing
the risk of disproportionate punishment.”120 Professor Massaro
deems this calibration regarding the proportionality of shaming
punishments to be unfeasible.121 Because of this inconsistency,
shaming penalties can have an unstable or unanticipated effect,
which violates notions of decency in the administration and
impact of criminal punishment.122
There is also an equality argument in the decency critique of
shaming punishments. Here, Professor Massaro provides a
compelling stance that a danger of the ad hoc nature of shaming
is that the most likely group to be targeted consists of individuals
with the least political and social capital.123 The equality
argument also rejects shaming sanctions as they can lead to
disproportionately punitive penalties for these offenders that
exceed any recognized parameters of specific or general
deterrence.124 Further, as Professor Posner notes, the potential
spillover effect of stigma in shaming, whereby individuals
associated with the offender are collaterally stigmatized,
certainly violates notions of equality in a decent society.125 Under

118
See, e.g., Massaro, Shame, Culture, supra note 45, at 1937–38 (noting how
shaming does not work within a discrete time period).
119
See, e.g., id. at 1937–40 (detailing a proportionality critique of criminal
shaming, which has no place in a decent society).
120
Garvey, Shaming Punishments, supra note 82, at 748.
121
See Massaro, Shame Implications, supra note 103, at 692 (describing this
fine-tuning as impractical).
122
See id. (discussing this widely variant effect in a critique of shaming
sanctions).
123
See Massaro, Shame, Culture, supra note 45, at 1940.
124
See id. at 1941 (discussing the disconnections between deterrence and
shaming punishments for socially marginalized offenders).
125
See POSNER, supra note 107, at 93 (noting how shaming can also target the
punished’s family members).
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this critique, because shaming punishments violate notions of
equality, which are at the core of decent democracy, they should
be rejected as means of discipline.
Working with similar roots of this equality and decency
critique, the hierarchical nature of criminal shaming
punishments, which was previewed by Professor Kahan’s first
article on shaming,126 has also been criticized as a characteristic
that is not expressive of the decency of an egalitarian society.127
As articulated by Jessica Clarke, “Shaming penalties have
historically been employed to reaffirm class relationships and
reinforce the shamed person’s subordinate status.”128 Professor
Nussbaum has also criticized shaming punishments as being
contradictory to decency with this respect: “[T]here is surely
something indecent about the idea that a liberal society, one built
upon ideas of human dignity and equality, and respect for the
individual, would express [a hierarchy of a ‘normal class above
the shamed’] through its public system of law.”129
Another lens of this hierarchical critique was expressed by
Professor Kahan in his 2006 article What’s Really Wrong with
Shaming Sanctions,130 which recants his 1996 article, What Do
Alternative Sanctions Mean?.131 In this latter article, Kahan
determined that “[w]hat’s really wrong with shaming
penalties . . . is that they are deeply partisan: when society picks
them, it picks sides, aligning itself with those who subscribe to
norms that give pride of place to community and social
differentiation rather than to individuality and equality.”132
Adopting the Gusfield-Wildavsky theory of expressive political
economy,133 Kahan formulated that shaming punishments suffer
from a lack of expressive overdetermination, in that they “bear
meanings perceived as affirming the values of only some cultural

126

See supra notes 67–77 and accompanying text.
See Jessica A. Clarke, Against Immutability, 125 YALE L.J. 2, 21 (2015)
(quoting Kahan, Shaming Sanctions, supra note 78, at 2086–88) (“[M]any
egalitarians oppose shaming practices as being ‘characteristic of hierarchical
relationships.’ ”).
128
See id. at 21–22.
129
NUSSBAUM, supra note 43, at 232 (emphasis in original).
130
See Kahan, Shaming Sanctions, supra note 78, at 2075.
131
See Kahan, Alternative Sanctions, supra note 67, at 591.
132
Kahan, Shaming Sanctions, supra note 78, at 2076.
133
See id. at 2081–82 (describing the sociopolitical basis for this perspective).
127
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perspectives and as denigrating others.”134 For Kahan, the true
problem of shaming punishments is that they “resonate with
significations of hierarchy and community that assault the
sensibilities of those who favor more egalitarian and
individualistic forms of social organization.”135 This risk of
hegemonic partisanship runs counter to the ideals of a decent
society.136
Consequently, the decency critique of criminal shaming
punishments is a multifaceted one. It provides that the erosion
of dignity that is inherent in shaming penalties results in a
commensurate erosion of decency within society. It argues that
shaming penalties introduce the malevolent normalization of
cruelty. This argument has pointed concern with how shaming
can lead to uncontrollable outcomes via the government’s
delegation of punishment through the transfer of the imposition
of stigma on the offender to the unpredictable populace. It also
argues that shaming sanctions fail to meet effective punishment
theory parameters as they lack proportionality, and, therefore,
efficacy; in sum, these sanctions exceed any type of general or
specific deterrence requirements. Finally, this critique argues
that shaming penalties—characterized by their hierarchical and
hegemonic means—violate notions of equality at the heart of a
decent society. Each prong of the decency critique provides a
valid basis for the discontinuation of the use of shaming
punishments in the American criminal justice system.
3.

A Moral-Educative Mission

Criminal shaming punishments have also been criticized in
terms of their inabilities to fulfill an overall moral-educative
mission.137 Criminal punishments should not just deter, punish,
134

Id. at 2085.
Id. at 2087.
136
Id. at 2076. This perception has been criticized. See Markel, Wrong Turns,
supra note 92, at 1393 (criticizing Kahan’s recanting perspective because it indicates
“that the state should not pursue punishments that lack public consensus because a
liberal state should remain neutral among the competing worldviews of diverse
citizens”).
137
See, e.g., Kimberly A. Thomas, Beyond Mitigation: Towards A Theory of
Allocution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2641, 2677 (2007) (discussing the difficulty of
tailoring an appropriate shaming punishment for a defendant that will educate the
individual about conduct avoidance and lead him or her towards more positive
outcomes).
135
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or incentivize; they must also instruct and educate.138 This
moral-educative perspective on punishment comes from “the
Durkheimian functionalist notion that the criminal law serves to
identify and reinforce basic social norms about right and wrong,
that ‘[c]rime brings together upright consciences and
concentrates them.’ ”139 Professor Garvey illuminates this point
by focusing on the moral education or moral reform theory of
punishment, whereby punishment is designed to provide moral
instruction to the offender through bilateral dialogue, rather
than through unilateral condemnation.140 However, Garvey
deems shaming as a punishment that does not satisfy moral
education parameters; it is, instead, “a monologue in which the
state expresses its disapproval and disavowal of the offender’s
wrongdoing,”141 which “do[es] little to educate.”142
Another aspect of the moral-educative mission critique
extends the focus from the punished individual to the community
that also must endure the shaming penalty, which connects with
key aspects of the decency critique.143 This particular argument
analyzes the negative net-widening educative effects of shaming
punishments in terms of naturalizing citizens to rights
constriction, rather than educating them for active participation
in a liberal democracy.144 As advanced by Steven Schulhofer, this
view asserts that the government’s use of shaming sanctions
results in ever-increasing attempts by the state to place people
within the vise of social control.145 Therefore, in line with

138

See Mark K. Moller, Comment, Sympathy, Community, and Promising:
Adam Smith’s Case for Reviving Moral Consideration, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 213, 241
(1999) (emphasizing these functions of law).
139
Tonry, supra note 81, at 1764 (quoting EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF
LABOR IN SOCIETY 102 (George Simson trans., Free Press 1933)).
140
See Garvey, Shaming Punishments, supra note 82, at 738–39, 742, 763
(outlining the moral education theory of punishment and defining the nature of its
expressive impact).
141
Id. at 763.
142
Id. at 784.
143
See supra Part II.B.2.
144
See NUSSBAUM, supra note 43, at 237 (discussing this argument against
shaming).
145
See id. at 236 (citing to personal correspondence with Stephen Schulhofer for
the basis for his claims).
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Professor Nussbaum’s view, shaming does “not function as a
progressive reform, but rather as an agent of increased social
homogeneity and social control.”146
Shaming punishments do not teach lessons regarding
dignity, decency, or other positive moral values.147 As stated by
Professor Markel, “[P]unishment should aim at connecting the
offender to an understanding of lawfulness and give the offender
an opportunity to internalize those lawful values in the life he [or
she] leads during and after the retributive encounter.”148
However, shaming sanctions provide no opportunities for
atonement and fail to fulfill any form of a moral-educative
mission.149 Instead, as Professor Markel concludes, shaming
results in, “at most, a retributive spectacle that is devoid of other
positive
community-expressive
or
community-reinforcing
content,”150 and that can have a rights-constriction spillover effect
for the greater community.151 Therefore, criminal shaming
punishments are not compatible with the educative mission of
instruction of liberal moral values in a civic democracy.152
4.

Conclusion

Criminal shaming punishments “exhibit none of the features
necessary to create a ‘political community united by basic
principles’ of decency and dignity.”153 They also fail to fulfill any
146

Id. at 237.
See Tonry, supra note 81, at 1755 (categorizing Professor Kahan’s “theory of
disintegrative shaming [as one] that takes traditional sociological ideas about the
moral-educative effects of punishment and humane modern ideas about
‘reintegrative shaming’ and turns them into deeply repressive ideas about the use of
human beings to the end of appeasing public appetites for ‘debasement’ ”) (footnotes
omitted).
148
Markel, Shaming Punishments, supra note 21, at 2220.
149
See Stephen P. Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1801,
1812 (1999) (“[S]hame forms no part of the atonement model. Guilt leads to
atonement; shame leads nowhere.”).
150
Markel, Shaming Punishments, supra note 21, at 2180 (emphasis omitted).
151
See supra notes 125, 144 and accompanying text.
152
See, e.g., Markel, Shaming Punishments, supra note 21, at 2228 (arguing the
embrace of intentional degradation in shaming punishments renders them
incompatible with liberal virtues); Geraldine Szott Moohr, An Enron Lesson: The
Modest Role of Criminal Law in Preventing Corporate Crime, 55 FLA. L. REV. 937,
963 (2003) (noting the attenuated educative effects of criminal law shaming
sanctions).
153
Markel, Shaming Punishments, supra note 21, at 2228 (quoting Stephen
Macedo, In Defense of Liberal Public Reason: Are Slavery and Abortion Hard Cases?,
147
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of the aspects of a moral-educative mission approach to
punishment theory.154 Consequently, under each of the critiques
of criminal shaming penalties—dignity, decency, and a moraleducative mission—these punishments should be abandoned as
sanctions in the American criminal justice system.
C.

The Philosophical Rejection of School-Shaming Punishments

Many K-12 schools have adopted a retributively punitive
approach, rather than a rehabilitative or reformative one, in
disciplining their students.155
Within this educational
disciplinary approach, the use of disintegrative shaming
punishments has flourished.156 However, shaming discipline has
no more place in the schoolhouse than it does in criminal law.
The core philosophical critiques of criminal shaming—dignity,
decency, and a moral-educative mission—support the
philosophical rejection of school-shaming punishments.157 In fact,
these critiques have more resonance in an educational milieu
because the key tenets of dignity, decency, and a moral-educative
mission are the desired pedagogical goals and civic aims of

in NATURAL LAW AND PUBLIC REASON 11, 14 (Robert P. George & Christopher Wolfe
eds., 2000)).
154
See supra Part II.B.3.
155
See Marilyn Armour, Restorative Practices: Righting the Wrongs of
Exclusionary School Discipline, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 999, 1001 (2016) (discussing
“increasingly negative school climates” and “educators’ retributive orientation to
student behavior”); Fedders, supra note 52, at 569 (“No longer viewed as deserving
of second chances or entitled to rehabilitation efforts, students are seen as meriting
harsh and punitive treatment.”); Louis Michael Seidman, Factual Guilt and the
Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 436, 494 (1980) (identifying the “retributive element to school
discipline”).
156
See, e.g., Barbara Fedders & Jason Langberg, School Discipline Reform:
Incorporating the Supreme Court’s “Age Matters” Jurisprudence, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
933, 954 (2013) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
511 (1969)) (arguing that schools for many reasons, including their infliction of
shaming punishments, have become “enclaves of totalitarianism”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
157
See William Haft, More than Zero: The Cost of Zero Tolerance and the Case
for Restorative Justice in Schools, 77 DENV. U. L. REV. 795, 800 (2000) (emphasis
omitted) (discussing the heightened moral responsibility educators have in
fashioning disciplinary policies of dignity and decency and urging a philosophicalpedagogical approach to determine whether a disciplinary policy “ought to be
enforced from an educational standpoint”).
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American education.158 Therefore, the violations that occur when
shaming is imposed in schools tear apart the very foundations of
what public schooling in a liberal democratic state should be.
This Section of the Article demonstrates the applicability of
the core critiques of criminal shaming onto school shaming to
support the rejection of these sanctions in the educational
environment.159 Although this philosophical argument applies
equally to all school shaming,160 it will use the paradigmatic
examples of strip searches, compelled apologies, dress code
shaming punishments, and denials of gender-identity restroom
access as concrete illustrations of why schools must abandon the
Because school-shaming
shaming form of discipline.161
punishments are violative of dignity, decency, and a moral-

158

See Stanley Ingber, Liberty and Authority: Two Facets of the Inculcation of
Virtue, 69 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 421, 444 (1995) (arguing American public schools must
inculcate students with the values of individual dignity); Thomas C. Grey, How To
Write a Speech Code Without Really Trying: Reflections on the Stanford Experience,
29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 891, 928 (1996) (discussing how “conventions of decency” are
paramount in public schools); Josie Foehrenbach Brown, Inside Voices: Protecting
the Student-Critic in Public Schools, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 253, 267–68 (2012)
(articulating the American pedagogical philosophies that emphasize a moraleducative mission in preparation of students for citizenship).
159
This approach is appropriate given the parallels between school discipline
and criminal punishment. See, e.g., Cara Suvall, Essay, Restorative Justice in
Schools: Learning from Jena High School, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 547, 565
(2009) (identifying retributive justice as a common denominator between school
discipline and criminal justice punishments).
160
School-shaming punishments are not limited to this Article’s examples. See,
e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 826 (2002) (discussing a school policy that
would shame students by barring their access to extracurricular activities for a
refusal to consent to a monitored, suspicionless drug urinalysis test). Although an
exhaustive catalogue of such punishments goes beyond the scope of this Article, this
philosophical rejection extends to all rights-violative punitive school-shaming
measures.
161
These shaming punishments are particularly appropriate for a legal
philosophical rejection, as they all violate students’ constitutional rights as well. See
Cooley, supra note 27 (manuscript at 31, 42–43) (arguing compelled apologies are
violative of students’ First Amendment rights and strip searches are violative of
students’ Fourth Amendment rights). Future scholarship by this author will
advocate that gender-discriminatory dress code violation punishments and
transgender student restroom access denials are violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.
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educative mission—and are therefore violative of the guiding
philosophies of K-12 American education—they should and must
be rejected as school disciplinary measures.162
1.

Dignity

School-shaming punishments are antithetical to the concept
of dignity, which is a central tenet of the pedagogical goals and
moral aims of American schools.163 Specific examples of schoolshaming sanctions that degrade students, depriving them of their
dignity, include strip searches, compelled apologies, dress code
shaming punishments, and restroom access denials.164
By
examining how school shaming violates dignity, it becomes clear
that the same dignitary concerns raised in critiques of criminal
law shaming sanctions are present in the evaluation of the
validity of shaming sanctions in schools. Specifically, schoolshaming penalties—like their criminal equivalents—are
inapposite to notions of equality of dignity, result in the
degradation of humanity, and impose a permanent harm through
loss of dignity on both an individual and transactional level in
violation of the social norms of a civic democracy.165
Consequently, like the dignity critique of criminal shaming, a
dignity critique of educational shaming supports the view that
these practices should be abandoned as disciplinary measures as
they are violative of the pedagogical goal of dignity.166
Strip searches are a type of school shaming that poses a
“serious affront to human dignity.”167 School strip searches
qualify as shaming rituals, because they are administered in a
162
See Brown, supra note 158, at 315 (“[A]ppropriate responses to
[school]children should be grounded in . . . respect for children as persons.”).
163
See, e.g., Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L.
REV. 169, 204 n.177 (2011) (characterizing equality and dignity as core functions of
American public schools); Charles Robert Tremper, Respect for the Human Dignity of
Minors: What the Constitution Requires, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1293, 1310 (1988)
(discussing the Supreme Court’s recognition of “the overriding constitutional
objective of affirming human dignity” in schools).
164
See infra text accompanying notes 167–194.
165
See infra text accompanying notes 195–202.
166
See Jason P. Nance, Student Surveillance, Racial Inequalities, and Implicit
Racial Bias, 66 EMORY L.J. 765, 800 (2017) (emphasizing the critical role schools can
and should play in “conveying in word and deed that all students are entitled to
equal respect and dignity”).
167
Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 347 (2012) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
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punitive way in front of some type of school community audience
when a student is suspected of noncompliant behavior and are
inherently shaming based.168 The indignity of school strip
searches and the corresponding degradation of students169 have
no place in an environment that is preparing students for
citizenship in a liberal democracy.170 Strip searches “impose
unjustified humiliation”171 and assure harm.172 This harmful
humiliation in the K-12 context was recognized by the Supreme
Court to give rise to a constitutional injury173 in Safford Unified
School District No. 1 v. Redding, which held that a student’s
Fourth Amendment rights were violated by a school strip
search.174 Given the indisputable indignity of student strip
searches, they should no longer be used as a disciplinary
shaming method as they do not align with the aim of dignity in
the schooling of American children.
Compelled apologies that are used as school-shaming
punishments for subjective value judgment forms of discipline
also frustrate the pedagogical goal of dignity.175 These shaming
sanctions are problematic when school officials deem student
speech discreditable or dishonorable,176 but it does not
168

See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 375 (2009)
(finding a student’s exposure of the body “for a search is responding to an accusation
reserved for suspected wrongdoers”).
169
See id. at 376–77 (discussing these characteristics of student strip searches).
170
See, e.g., Robert F. Blomquist, Rethinking the Citizen as Prosecutor Model of
Environmental Enforcement Under the Clean Water Act: Some Overlooked Problems
of Outcome-Independent Values, 22 GA. L. REV. 337, 348 (1988) (deeming strip
searches to be procedures of degradation that require safeguards to protect
“[h]umaneness and [r]espect for [i]ndividual [d]ignity”).
171
Joshua Kleinfeld, Two Cultures of Punishment, 68 STAN. L. REV. 933, 1001
(2016).
172
See Florence, 566 U.S. at 345 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (calling strip searches
“inherently harmful, humiliating, and degrading”).
173
See Josh Bowers, Probable Cause, Constitutional Reasonableness, and the
Unrecognized Point of a “Pointless Indignity,” 66 STAN. L. REV. 987, 1018 (2014)
(discussing the Court’s discovery of “a constitutional injury in humiliation” in
Redding).
174
See Redding, 557 U.S. at 368.
175
See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Essay, Integrating
Remorse and Apology into Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 125 (2004)
(discussing how apology should not be used “to inflict pain,” “satisfy the community’s
bloodlust,” or “ostracize offenders”).
176
See, e.g., T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 807 F. Supp. 2d
767, 789 (N.D. Ind. 2011) (finding a school policy that required a compelled apology
for dishonorable or discreditable student conduct “introduce[d] a nebulous degree of
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“materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school” as required
for constitutional regulation per Tinker.177 Here, a compelled
apology expresses that the penalized student should be
condemned by school authority figures for the speech,178 despite
the student’s First Amendment rights to engage in such
expressive conduct.179 When used in cases where students are
punished for constitutionally protected sexually expressive
behavior,180 these punishments become mechanisms of slutIn all of these
shaming primarily female students.181
circumstances, forced apologies defy the justifications offered by
their proponents that they “promote harmony by offering truth,
breaking punitive cycles, and analyzing the original cause of
discord.”182 Instead, they are painfully humiliating social rituals
designed to exact suffering on the punished individual.183
Consequently, forced apologies, which issue from the

value judgment [because i]ssues of character and values involve such a broad
spectrum of reasonable interpretation (but also strongly-held disagreement) as to be
insufficiently conclusive for a disciplinary standard”).
177
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969)
(quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
178
See LiJia Gong & Alina Hoffman, Note, Sexting and Slut-Shaming: Why
Prosecution of Teen Self-Sexters Harms Women, 13 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 577, 583
(2012) (arguing against these destrucitvely critical forms of school shaming).
179
See, e.g., Seamons v. Snow, 206 F.3d 1021, 1028, 1030–31 (10th Cir. 2000)
(determining that a reasonably competent school official would be aware that a
forced apology for nondisruptive, nonobscene, and nonschool-sponsored speech—
specifically, the truthful reporting of criminal and tortious behavior—violated the
student’s First Amendment rights).
180
See, e.g., T.V., 807 F. Supp. 2d at 784–85 (determining that a compelled
apology for two female high school students who engaged in off-campus sexually
expressive online speech that did not meet the Tinker standard of regulation was a
violation of the students’ First Amendment rights).
181
Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 353 n.47 (2014) (“ ‘Slut-shaming’ criticizes women for
[any type of conduct related to] sexual activity.”); see also Aya Gruber, Anti-Rape
Culture, 64 U. KAN. L. REV. 1027, 1046 (2016) (noting how this oppressive
phenomenon is often inflicted as a hierarchal weapon against marginalized women).
182
Lisa Kern Griffin, Criminal Lying, Prosecutorial Power, and Social Meaning,
97 CALIF. L. REV. 1515, 1539 (2009).
183
See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Well Excuse Me!—Remorse, Apology, and Criminal
Sentencing, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 371, 384 (2006) (describing the humiliation of a
compelled apology).
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enforcement of value judgment-laden disciplinary policies, should
be abandoned as they are violative of the pedagogical and moral
aims of instilling dignity in the American classroom.
Dress code violation shaming punishments also are in direct
conflict with the pedagogical goal of dignity.184 “[E]merging
conceptions of gender equality and identity should alter outdated
dress code rules”185 to eliminate the indignity of such shaming
punishments. For sanctions of dress codes that focus on the
ideology that girls should dress modestly, the implication is that
such girls are immodest, and without dignity, and invite
“disruption because the presumptively heterosexual male
students would be distracted.”186
Institutional disdain for
effeminate boys is perpetuated through dress code shaming
punishments that treat or impact male students differently,
thereby divesting penalized boys of their dignity.187 Transgender
students are also often targeted by dress code violations, based
on discriminatory treatment and sex and gender stereotyping
that stand in direct opposition to the concepts of fundamental
dignity of all students.188 Given the indignity that is imputed
upon both boys and girls by dress code shaming punishments,
they should no longer be used as a disciplinary method as they do
not align with the pedagogy of equality of dignity in the schooling
of American children.

184
In some instances, dress code violations have led to the arrest of children,
which is an extreme example of how these shaming punishments take away the
essential dignity of students. See, e.g., Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization
Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 706 (2005) (“[P]olice have been used to enforce a
school’s internal rules of conduct, with children arrested for . . . violating the student
dress code.”).
185
Brown, supra note 158, at 288.
186
RUTHANN ROBSON, DRESSING CONSTITUTIONALLY: HIERARCHY, SEXUALITY,
AND DEMOCRACY FROM OUR HAIRSTYLES TO OUR SHOES 73 (2013).
187
See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Sticky Intuitions and the Future of Sexual
Orientation Discrimination, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1375, 1403 (2010) (discussing the
existence within American culture of “strong reactions, sometimes bordering on
disgust, toward effeminate men and boys”).
188
See Holly V. Franson, Comment, The Rise of the Transgender Child:
Overcoming Societal Stigma, Institutional Discrimination, and Individual Bias To
Enact and Enforce Nondiscriminatory Dress Code Policies, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 497,
518–22 (2013) (outlining dignitary and legal claims against schools involving
transgender students being targeted by dress code shaming punishments).
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Finally, restroom shaming practices that bar transgender
students from using the restroom that conforms with their
gender identity or that require transgender students to use a
segregated restroom that is not used by other students are in
direct opposition to the pedagogical goal of dignity.189 These
restroom mandates are shaming punishments that fall squarely
into the category of a state-sponsored “othering” of transgender
students for a violation of claimed school community norms.190 It
is ironic that schools have raised dignity claims as purported
justifications for these shaming punishments,191 because they
categorically deny the dignity of the targeted students.192 Schools
should teach students that they have fundamental liberties of
dignity.193 However, these restroom access denials erode the
fundamental dignity of the student because they are premised on
his or her gender identity not conforming with the school’s
primacy on birth-assigned sex.194 Given the indignity that is
forced upon transgender students by restroom shaming
mandates, these shaming devices should no longer be permitted
as they do not align with the aim of dignity in the schooling of
American children.
The examination of these school-shaming examples
affirmatively gives rise to the same dignity concerns that have
been at the forefront of the critique of criminal shaming
189

See Henry, supra note 163, at 203 (“[T]he [Supreme] Court’s equal protection
jurisprudence continues to rely on equality as dignity to give substance to its
egalitarian mandate.”); M. Dru Levasseur, Gender Identity Defines Sex: Updating
the Law To Reflect Modern Medical Science Is Key to Transgender Rights, 39 VT. L.
REV. 943, 1004 (2015) (characterizing institutional restroom access discrimination
against transgender individuals as an act of shaming and a “refus[al] to recognize
transgender people as people”).
190
See Developments in the Law—Transgender Youth and Access to Gendered
Spaces in Education, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1680, 1728 (2014) [hereinafter Transgender
Youth] (noting the difficulty in teaching community when transgender youth, as “a
highly visible minority [are] forced to suffer based solely on who they are”).
191
See infra text accompanying note 208.
192
See Harper Jean Tobin & Jennifer Levi, Securing Equal Access to SexSegregated Facilities for Transgender Students, 28 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 301,
306–07 (2013) (analyzing the degradation that transgender students endure when
forced to use gender-inappropriate or segregated restroom facilities).
193
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015) (discussing liberty
rights attached to dignity).
194
See, e.g., G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 132 F. Supp. 3d 736,
749 (E.D. Va. 2015) (discussing the loss of dignity incurred by a transgender student
when he was subjected to a restroom shaming mandate).
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punishments. School shaming, like criminal shaming, eradicates
individual dignity and imposes stigma195 in the ways examined
by Professors Goffman, Massaro, and Nussbaum.196 By stripping
away the targeted student’s humanity,197 shaming degrades the
civic democratic ideals of dignity and equality that should be at
the core of public schools’ values198 and disciplinary practices.199
This degradation is squarely within the ambit of Professor
Markel’s dignity critique of criminal shaming sanctions.200 In
fact, this degradation is amplified because its targets are
schoolchildren,201 as opposed to convicted criminal defendants.
The taking away of dignity, which results from schoolshaming punishments, is not a fleeting consequence, either. Like
criminal shaming punishments, these educational sanctions
often result in significant, long-lasting reputational damage to
the penalized student.202 This harm can result in subsequent
legal and civil disabilities,203 permanent emotional and
195
See Clarke, supra note 127, at 22 (discussing the stigmatizing effect of
shaming punishments through their removal of dignity and “reinforce[ment of] the
shamed person’s subordinate status”).
196
See supra notes 82–98 and accompanying text.
197
See Clarke, supra note 127, at 22 (describing shaming as conflicting with a
liberal democratic society’s ideals).
198
See MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND
GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 54 (1983) (arguing schools should promote
values of equality and “respect for individual dignity”); Robert Trager & Joseph A.
Russomanno, Free Speech for Public School Students: A “Basic Educational
Mission,” 17 HAMLINE L. REV. 275, 301 (1993) (arguing respect for individual dignity
should be fostered in public schools).
199
See Sarah Jane Forman, Countering Criminalization: Toward a Youth
Development Approach to School Searches, 14 SCHOLAR 301, 373 (2011) (“[Schools’]
disciplinary policies and practices should comport with their special role in the
socialization of future democratic citizens; to this end, they should respect students’
autonomy, dignity, and individual rights.”).
200
See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text.
201
See Josie Foehrenbach Brown, Developmental Due Process: Waging A
Constitutional Campaign to Align School Discipline with Developmental Knowledge,
82 TEMP. L. REV. 929, 995 (2009) (arguing schools have the educational and
constitutional responsibility “to affirm the dignity of each student”).
202
See Melissa Mortazavi, Consuming Identities: Law, School Lunches, and
What It Means To Be American, 24 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 21 (2014)
(discussing how children’s impressionability means that schools often determine the
permanent dignity and self-respect of students).
203
See Andrew Horwitz, Coercion, Pop-Psychology, and Judicial Moralizing:
Some Proposals for Curbing Judicial Abuse of Probation Conditions, 57 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 75, 147–48 (2000) (arguing that labeling individuals as deviant, which
results from shaming, can lead to future deviant behavior and further punishments).
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psychological harms,204 and deleterious collateral consequences205
that run parallel to the harms articulated by Professor
Nussbaum.206 These collateral consequences impact both the
individual student and the greater school community.207 By
teaching students that it is appropriate to stigmatize students
through shaming, schools stand in direct contravention with
their long-standing role of inculcating “an understanding that
citizenship . . . should include attention to the dignity and safety
of other[s].”208 Finally, the violations of transactional dignity that
result from school shaming are commensurate, if not more
magnified,209 with the transactional dignity harms that are
incurred by criminal shaming as outlined by Professor
Whitman.210 Consequently, analyzing school shaming through
the lens of personal dignity being a basic right of humanity,211

204
See Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV.
949, 1005 (2009) (discussing the anger that results from punitive shaming); Clarke,
supra note 127, at 22 (“Those targeted by shaming practices often internalize
stigma, coming to believe themselves to be deficient.”); Orly Rachmilovitz, Family
Assimilation Demands and Sexual Minority Youth, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1374, 1393
(2014) (categorizing behaviors that “convey messages that gender nonconformity or
same-sex orientation is shameful, sinful, or otherwise devalued” as harmful to the
long-term physical and mental health of LGBT youth).
205
See Peter H. Huang & Christopher J. Anderson, A Psychology of Emotional
Legal Decision Making: Revulsion and Saving Face in Legal Theory and Practice, 90
MINN. L. REV. 1045, 1064 (2006) (reviewing NUSSBAUM, supra note 43) (highlighting
the immunizing effect shaming has on its intended targets and its inverse effect of
intended deterrence); Mortazavi, supra note 202, at 21 (“[W]hat is normalized (or
stigmatized) in the school setting often directly modifies and supplants the child’s
original sense of identity.”).
206
See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
207
See Brown, supra note 201, at 994 (discussing how school disciplinary
measures, like shaming, demonstrate mistreatment of other students and result in a
lack of general deterrence).
208
Danielle Keats Citron & Helen Norton, Intermediaries and Hate Speech:
Fostering Digital Citizenship for Our Information Age, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1435, 1476
(2011) (discussing educators’ long-standing role against bullying as “they endeavor
to teach children and adults alike how to treat others with respect”).
209
See Clarke, supra note 127, at 22 (discussing how the loss of dignity and
exclusion from the stigma of shaming results in a breakdown of community empathy
for the stigmatized).
210
See supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text.
211
See Richard B. Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values: Toward a More
Responsive Approach to Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 118 (1978)
(“Because the concept of personal dignity is basic to humanity, it can serve as a
useful focus for our attempt to apply moral values, such as fairness, to our
perception of the persons, institutions, and forces confronting us.”).
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like scholars have done for criminal shaming,212 yields a similarly
strong, if not stronger, critique against the use of such sanctions
within the schoolhouse as disciplinary measures.213
Sadly, an aspect of shaming punishments that has been
advocated as a benefit for some scholars in the criminal law
context is the imposition of stigma on and loss of dignity for the
punished individual.214 However, a core civic aim of American
schools is to teach, maintain, and protect an environment of
human dignity.215
As argued by Ronald Dworkin, such
“principles of human dignity that . . . are embodied in the
Constitution and are now common ground in America” should be
a “dominant pedagogical strategy” in America’s K-12 public
schools.216 As defined by Leslie Meltzer Henry, “equality as
dignity” consists of these elements:
First, dignity is universal. It is an intrinsic quality of all
human beings, bestowed upon individuals not by social rank,
but simply by nature of being human. Human existence,
whether derived from God’s image or as an icon of humanity,
confers dignity.
Second, dignity is permanent.
Unlike
institutional status as dignity, equality as dignity does not wax
and wane, but instead remains constant.
Third, as a
consequence of these two features, dignity functions as a
horizontal and relational value.
Guided by the idea of

212

See supra notes 82–98 and accompanying text.
See Maryam Ahranjani, Can They Do That to Me?! Does the Eighth
Amendment Protect Children’s Best Interests?, 63 S.C. L. REV. 403, 404 (2011)
(discussing the Framers’ concern with “protecting citizens, particularly the most
vulnerable, from government imposition of excessive punishment in recognition of
human dignity”).
214
See, e.g., Kahan, Alternative Sanctions, supra note 67, at 638 (positively
framing shaming sanction consequences as “extremely unpleasant[, as t]hose who
lose the respect of their peers often suffer a crippling diminishment of self-esteem”).
215
See Martha Minow, Education for Co-Existence, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 18 (2002)
(arguing schools should aspire to “join every person in the network of mutual
recognition, individual dignity, and equality”); Miriam Rokeach & John Denvir,
Front-Loading Due Process: A Dignity-Based Approach to School Discipline, 67 OHIO
ST. L.J. 277, 278 (2006) (advocating that, as a matter of dignity, “[s]tudents, as
citizens, have a right to an education as well as to fair and respectful treatment
while obtaining it”).
216
Ronald Dworkin, Three Questions for America, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Sept. 21,
2006), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2006/09/21/three-questions-for-america.
213
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reciprocity, all humans owe respect to, and deserve respect
from, each other as beings of equal worth. Whether young or
old, sinner or saint, mentally high-performing or mentally
disabled, each person deserves the same basic respect.217

An egalitarian state must ascribe to this theory of equality
as dignity in all of its institutions, including in its public
schools.218 This concept—that “every person possesses dignity
that requires the government to treat them with respect”—has
“special significance in the educational setting.”219 In order for
public schools to incorporate this principle in a way that fosters
the well-being of children, administrators and teachers must
provide students with a learning environment that allows for the
safeguarding
of
individual
and
collective
dignity.220
Consequently, any disciplinary measure that erodes dignity, like
shaming, must be eliminated from the schools’ behavioral
management systems.
2.

Decency

School-shaming punishments are also adversative to the
concept of decency, which is another central tenet of the
pedagogical goals and moral aims of American schools.221
Specific examples of school-shaming sanctions that dissolve
decency in the school community include strip searches,
compelled apologies, dress code violation shaming punishments,
and restroom access denials.222 By examining how schoolshaming punishments, such as these examples, violate decency,
it becomes clear that the decency concerns raised in critiques of
criminal law shaming are present in the evaluation of the

217

Henry, supra note 163, at 202–03.
See Alan E. Garfield, What Should We Celebrate on Constitution Day?, 41 GA.
L. REV. 453, 498 (2007) (arguing “public schools should teach children that every
individual is deserving of dignity and respect” because of the constitutional
“commitment to create a society based on respect for human dignity”).
219
Rokeach & Denvir, supra note 215, at 288.
220
See Jason P. Nance, School Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, 2014
WIS. L. REV. 79, 133–34 (“The way that school officials primarily go about providing
for the well-being of children is to treat them with dignity and to provide them with
an appropriate learning environment.”).
221
See Dent Gitchel, Funding the Education of Arkansas’s Children: A
Summary of the Problems and Challenges, 27 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1, 25
(2004) (arguing “the first priority of state government” is a decent education).
222
See infra notes 225–256 and accompanying text.
218
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validity of school-shaming sanctions.
Specifically, schoolshaming penalties, like their criminal equivalents, harm
community decency through their erosion of individual dignity,
normalize cruelty with often uncontrollable outcomes, fail to
meet effective punishment theory requirements of either specific
or general deterrence due to their lack of proportionality, and
reinforce harmful notions of hierarchy and hegemony that run
counter to the ideals of equality in a decent democratic society.223
Consequently, like the decency critique of criminal shaming, a
commensurate critique of educational shaming supports the view
that they should be abandoned as disciplinary measures as they
are violative of the social norm in educational theory of
decency.224
School-shaming strip searches undercut the pedagogical goal
of decency. All searching disciplinary schemes are inherently
adversarial.225 This is magnified with school searches given the
hierarchical and hegemonic power differential between the adult
school actor and the targeted child.226 Shaming strip searches
transcend the pedagogical goal of decency given that “the adverse
psychological effect of a strip search is likely to be more severe
upon a child than an adult, especially a child who has been the
victim of sexual abuse.”227 Consequently, strip searches violate
the tenets of decency as they excessively intrude upon and
alienate the child’s acute vulnerability.228 This alienation of
individual student dignity violates the concept of decency within
the school community and normalizes cruelty.229 School strip
223

See supra Part II.B.2.
See Robin L. West, Tragic Rights: The Rights Critique in the Age of Obama,
53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 713, 736 (2011) (“A state should run a decent public school
system.”).
225
See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 677 (1995) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting) (noting the adversarial nature of school searches).
226
See Mashburn v. Yamhill County, 698 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1238 (D. Or. 2010)
(discussing the harmful power dynamics when an adult searches a child).
227
N.G. ex rel. S.C. v. Connecticut, 382 F.3d 225, 232 (2d Cir. 2004).
228
See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 374–75
(2009) (noting how the consistent experience of strip-searched children, “whose
adolescent vulnerability intensifies the patent intrusiveness of the exposure,” is
embarrassment, fright, and humiliation).
229
See Jessica R. Feierman & Riya S. Shah, Protecting Personhood: Legal
Strategies To Combat the Use of Strip Searches on Youth in Detention, 60 RUTGERS
L. REV. 67, 99 (2007) (discussing the cruelty and violations of individual dignity in
child strip searches).
224
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searches are not proportional to the targeted student’s alleged
offense, and thereby, they fail to meet effective punishment
theory requirements that are required in a decent society.230
Finally, strip searches of students have been “fairly understood
as so degrading that a number of communities have decided that
[they] are never reasonable and have banned them no matter
what the facts may be.”231 These discrete community bans should
be implemented nationwide, as school-shaming strip searches are
not only “an invasion of constitutional rights of some magnitude,”
but, “[m]ore than that: [they are] a violation of any known
principle of human decency.”232
Forced apologies that are used as school-shaming
punishments also undermine the pedagogical goal of moral
decency.233 The perceived injustice of a forced apology often
results in a response of student entrenchment, whereby the
students “harden[] their positions and elevat[e] their resistance
through either overt or covert actions.”234 This shaming-anger
cycle with all of its attendant, and perhaps uncontrollable,
opprobrium often will infect an entire school community, thereby
eroding any standing lessons of decent treatment of others.235 As
a result, these punishments’ actual and perceived lack of
proportionality fail to meet effective punishment theory
requirements of deterrence.236 Further, there is something
indecent about a society that forces “expressions of remorse
because of the leverage” of disciplinary authority,237 where
230
See Jane R. Bambauer & Toni M. Massaro, Outrageous and Irrational, 100
MINN. L. REV. 281, 347 (2015) (discussing the Supreme Court’s determination that a
student strip search was unconstitutional “in light of its lack of proportionality to
the student’s [alleged] offense”).
231
Redding, 557 U.S. at 375.
232
Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977, 983 (6th Cir. 1984).
233
See, e.g., Stephen E. Henderson, Hijacked from Both Sides—Why Religious
Extremists and Religious Bigots Share an Interest in Preventing Academic Discourse
on Criminal Jurisprudence Based on the First Principles of Christianity, 37 IDAHO L.
REV. 103, 129 (2000) (arguing the most egregious shaming punishments are
compelled apologies).
234
Brent T. White, Say You’re Sorry: Court-Ordered Apologies as a Civil Rights
Remedy, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1261, 1289 (2006).
235
See infra note 260 and accompanying text.
236
See Martha Minow, Forgiveness, Law, and Justice, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1615,
1620 (2015) (arguing forced apologies “cannot compel the feelings they are meant to
express”).
237
Griffin, supra note 182, at 1541.
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“adults appear to ‘gang up’ on the child or attempt to ‘shame’ the
child into . . . apology.”238 These harmful notions of hierarchy and
hegemony do not agree with the egalitarian ideals of a liberal
society’s educational system.239 Consequently, the indecency that
results from using compelled apologies as shaming punishments
serves as a basis for the cessation of their use in schools.
Dress code shaming punishments are inapposite to the
pedagogical goal of decency. It is ironic that many dress code
shaming advocates premise their support for these sanctions on
claims of a “dress code of decency,”240 because these punishments
operate in the inverse.241 They teach and perpetuate pernicious
sex and gender stereotyping,242 which corrodes community
decency through the harmful taking away of individual dignity of
the penalized students and which normalizes cruelty.243 Further,
the gender-biased enforcement and outcomes of dress code
discipline instill a damaging environment of hierarchy and
hegemony by reinforcing patriarchal, rather than egalitarian,
norms within the schoolhouse.244
238
Kristin Henning, What’s Wrong with Victims’ Rights in Juvenile Court?:
Retributive Versus Rehabilitative Systems of Justice, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1107, 1167
(2009).
239
See Susan Cleary Morse, Using Salience and Influence To Narrow the Tax
Gap, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 483, 514 (2009) (noting the appeal of shaming to
hierarchists but not to egalitarians).
240
Lorraine Nencel, Professionalization, Sexualization: When Global Meets
Local in the Working Identities of Secretaries in Lima, Peru, in THE GENDER
QUESTION IN GLOBALIZATION: CHANGING PERSPECTIVES AND PRACTICES 41, 51 (Tine
Davids & Francien van Driel eds., 2005) (coining the term a “dress code of decency”);
see also Haft, supra note 157, at 800 (“Educators who support dress codes often
assert that they encourage discipline, enhance self-esteem, and promote unity in the
school setting.”).
241
See Jennifer L. Levi, Misapplying Equality Theories: Dress Codes at Work, 19
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 353, 372 (2008) (“Rather than being a benign reflection of
cultural norms, gender-based dress codes . . . lie at the heart of the problem that
equality guarantees seek to address.”).
242
See Natalie Smith, Eliminating Gender Stereotypes in Public School Dress
Codes: The Necessity of Respecting Personal Preference, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 251, 252
(2012) (discussing school dress codes’ rigidity and perpetuation of “archaic genderbased” stereotypes).
243
See id. at 255–56; see also Meredith Johnson Harbach, Sexualization, Sex
Discrimination, and Public School Dress Codes, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 1039, 1043–44
(2016).
244
See Ann C. McGinley, Reconsidering Legal Regulation of Race, Sex, and
Sexual Orientation, 50 TULSA L. REV. 341, 361–66 (2015) (detailing the
interconnections between dress codes and “concepts of hierarchy, class, and gender”);
see also Martha Minow, Between Intimates and Between Nations: Can Law Stop the
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Quite simply, the bulk of these student shaming
punishments unequally and indecently burden female and
effeminate male schoolchildren via enforcement of both sexually
discriminatory dress codes and facially neutral ones.245 “Under
the guise of social order,” these punishments inappropriately put
the onus of “self-control, public decency, and sexual morality in
the school on girls’ shoulders.”246 As argued by Professor
Meredith Johnson Harbach, community-normed dress code
violation punishments are not “entirely sanguine . . . [as they]
automatically incorporate sexualized assumptions about girls’
bodies, reinforcing images of distracting female bodies that
should be covered up.”247 Professor Noa Ben-Asher identifies a
deep-rooted American cultural anxiety about male effeminacy as
the basis for the judicial tendency since the 1980s “to uphold
mandatory gender appearance policies in schools.”248 This results
in an indecent “ ‘everyday pedagogy,’ [that] reproduce[s negative]
normative gender and sexuality preferences.”249 The deleterious
curriculum
of
these
shaming
punishments
educates
schoolchildren to shy away from effeminate boys, to sexualize
girls, and to excuse boys’ objectification and harassment of girls
as a biological response.250 These teaching lessons do not reflect
the pedagogical goal of decency;251 they should be abandoned.

Violence?, Essay, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 851, 863 (2000) (discussing how the
humiliation of women results from “a world that assigns radically different roles by
gender, and monitors them through internalized notions of honor and shame”).
245
See Harbach, supra note 243, at 1056–57 (identifying dress codes’ indecent
imposition of “unequal burdens based on sex”).
246
SHAUNA POMERANTZ, GIRLS, STYLE, AND SCHOOL IDENTITIES: DRESSING THE
PART 8 (2008).
247
See Harbach, supra note 243, at 1056.
248
Noa Ben-Asher, The Two Laws of Sex Stereotyping, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1187,
1216 (2016).
249
Harbach, supra note 243, at 1044 (footnote omitted) (quoting Shauna
Pomerantz, Cleavage in a Tank Top: Bodily Prohibition and the Discourses of School
Dress Codes, 53 ALBERTA J. EDUC. RES. 373, 374 (2007)).
250
See Laura Bates, How School Dress Codes Shame Girls and Perpetuate Rape
Culture, TIME (May 22, 2015), http://time.com/3892965/everydaysexism-school-dresscodes-rape-culture (arguing school dress codes “teach[] our children that girls’ bodies
are dangerous, powerful and sexualised, and that boys are biologically programmed
to objectify and harass them”); Ben-Asher, supra note 248, at 1216.
251
See Amy L. Wax, Against Nature—On Robert Wright’s The Moral Animal, 63
U. CHI. L. REV. 307, 356 (1996) (noting how “[p]ublic shaming and stigmatization”
clash with feminism as “they routinely have been used to control female sexuality
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Finally, restroom access denials that bar transgender
students from using the restroom that conforms with their
gender identity or that require them to use a segregated
restroom not used by other students sharply conflict with the
pedagogical goal of decency.252
These restroom mandates
impinge on students’ privacy in contravention of the protections
of a decent society.253 Such actions clash with decent treatment
that should be accorded to every student in a positive educational
environment, and they will lead to additional retractions into
indecency.254 As Professor Martha Minow argues, “Until every
student is identified as different[,] . . . the tendency to create a
‘normal’ group and to label others as ‘deviant’ will remain
pronounced and take on forms of childish cruelty in the school
setting.”255 By labeling transgender students as deviant through
restroom access denials, schools reproduce injurious concepts of
hegemony, hierarchy, and inequality.256 Denying transgender
students access to restrooms conflicts with the pedagogical aims
of a positive learning environment and results in a devolution
from decency. Therefore, these shaming practices should no
longer be utilized.
The examination of these school-shaming punishments
affirmatively gives rise to the same decency concerns that have
been at the forefront of the critique of criminal shaming
punishments.257
School-shaming sanctions erode school
community decency through their erasure of individual student

and female social choice or to place women on the front lines of efforts to curb male
sexuality”).
252
See Tobin & Levi, supra note 192, at 306–07 (discussing the indecent
communicative impact that results from forcing transgender students to use genderinappropriate or segregated facilities).
253
See Jonathan Kahn, Privacy as a Legal Principle of Identity Maintenance, 33
SETON HALL L. REV. 371, 405 (2003) (claiming “privacy as a pre-political value basic
to a decent society”).
254
See Transgender Youth, supra note 190, at 1729 (discussing how transgender
youth fear discrimination, harassment, and violence in restrooms).
255
MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION,
AND AMERICAN LAW 31 (1990).
256
See Tobin & Levi, supra note 192, at 307 (arguing transgender restroom
access denials “communicate to the student and the entire community that he or she
is not normal[, which] reinforces any bias that peers may have about the student
and empowers them to engage in bullying”).
257
See supra Part II.B.2.
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dignity,258 similar to the dissolution that is at the core of
Professor Markel’s criminal shaming decency critique.259 The
normalization of cruelty is a natural result of school-shaming
punishments,260 which is commensurate to the normalizing effect
that Professors Posner and Massaro argued as a basis for the
rejection of shaming in criminal law.261 This normalization of
indecent
treatment
of
schoolchildren
is
particularly
problematic,262 as the community involvement aspect of shaming
results in the school as state delegating—and likely losing—
punishment controls to the crowd within the school
community.263 With a shaming punishment, a child “is held up to
the moral judgment of persons whose opinions he [or she] values
and is caused to feel unworthy of their esteem—or even their
love—unless he [or she] changes.”264
The concerns about
uncontrollable mob outcomes raised by Professors Whitman and
Nussbaum in their decency critiques of criminal shaming265
become magnified when extrapolated to school shaming as the
crowd at issue consists of minor schoolchildren,266 whose

258
See Fedders & Langberg, supra note 156, at 956 (footnotes omitted) (“The
current school discipline regime is alienating and isolating, and increasingly instills
in children a sense of hopelessness and despair.”); David Orentlicher, Spanking and
Other Corporal Punishment of Children by Parents: Overvaluing Pain, Undervaluing
Children, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 147, 177 (1998) (discussing how the undervaluation of
children in American social institutions results in a failure to provide them a life of
decency).
259
See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
260
See Massaro, Shame Implications, supra note 103, at 699 (“The decency
concern is based on the sense that shaming may be cruel and that normalizing
cruelty may encourage its proliferation, especially if the expressive accounts of
punishment’s effects on norms hold true.”).
261
See supra notes 107–108 and accompanying text.
262
See, e.g., Bruce E. Boyden, Constitutional Safety Valve: The Privileges or
Immunities Clause and Status Regimes in a Federalist System, 62 ALA. L. REV. 111,
166 (2010) (discussing how shaming enforces harmful gender-based norms).
263
See Clare Huntington, Repairing Family Law, 57 DUKE L.J. 1245, 1256
(2008) (arguing shaming is designed to generate emotions in the participating
community).
264
Jayne W. Barnard, Allocution for Victims of Economic Crimes, 77 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 39, 80 (2001).
265
See supra notes 113–116 and accompanying text.
266
See Susan Hanley Duncan, MySpace Is Also Their Space: Ideas for Keeping
Children Safe from Sexual Predators on Social-Networking Sites, 96 KY. L.J. 527,
556 (2008) (discussing how interaction with peers or emotional stimulation
dominates over individual cognitive control in adolescents).
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cognitive, emotional, and social development is not yet
complete267 and whose safety has been entrusted to the adult
leaders of the school.268
Additionally, school-shaming punishments fail to comply
with the parameters of effective punishment theory.269 They
result in neither specific nor general deterrence due to their lack
of proportionality, which raises the same concerns used by
Professors Garvey and Massaro in their rejection of criminal
shaming sanctions through a decency lens.270 Finally, school
shaming reinforces the same harmful notions of hierarchy and
hegemony that Professor Nussbaum and eventually even
Professor Kahan articulated as central foundations of opposition
to criminal shaming punishments.271 As a result, school-shaming
punishments conflict with the ideals of equality in a decent
democratic society272 that were explored by Professors Massaro
and Posner.273 These are the ideals that should be at the core of
all decent liberal institutions, especially schools,274 whose
pedagogy is essential to kids’ identity formation and
267
See Beatriz Luna, The Relevance of Immaturities in the Juvenile Brain to
Culpability and Rehabilitation, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1469, 1474–82 (2012) (identifying
the different stages of structural and functional maturation in the cognitive
development of adolescents); Carina Muir, Comment, Protecting America’s Children:
Why an Executive Order Banning Juvenile Solitary Confinement Is Not Enough, 44
PEPP. L. REV. 151, 189 (2016) (“In terms of incomplete psychological development,
adolescents’ prefrontal cortexes are not yet fully developed, leaving them more
impulsive and vulnerable than adults, which also mitigates their decision-making
ability.”).
268
See Peter B. Edelman, Toward a Comprehensive Antipoverty Strategy:
Getting Beyond the Silver Bullet, 81 GEO. L.J. 1697, 1738 (1993) (arguing schools
must safeguard children).
269
See John A. Bozza, “The Devil Made Me Do It”: Legal Implications of the New
Treatment Imperative, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 55, 81–82 (2002) (discussing the
lack of any empirical data to support a deterrence claim for shaming); Garvey,
Shaming Punishments, supra note 82, at 753–54 (finding the lack of empirical
inquiry regarding shaming punishments makes deterrence claims “highly
speculative”).
270
See supra notes 120–121 and accompanying text.
271
See supra notes 129–135 and accompanying text.
272
See David C. Gray, Extraordinary Justice, 62 ALA. L. REV. 55, 94 (2010)
(discussing how shaming perpetuates status inequality and subordination).
273
See supra notes 123–125 and accompanying text.
274
See Patsy E. Johnson, Equity, Motivation, and Leadership: A Matter of
Justice, 27 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 53, 59 (2004) (“In schools, justice includes
the belief that all children deserve a decent life and to have basic needs met such as
safety, respect, a sense of belonging (in response to hostile and unfriendly
environments), and fair treatment.”).
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understanding of the meaning of a civic democracy.275 Instead,
punitive shaming discipline leads to “a missed opportunity for
positive socialization, affirming democratic norms, and meeting
the developmental needs of students.”276 Consequently, the
indecent power differential that is abused during school shaming
requires its disuse, as liberal democracies must “insist that
school officials behave with common decency to their students.”277
For many shaming proponents in the criminal law context,
the fact that shaming penalties are degradation ceremonies that
require public participation is viewed as a positive attribute of
these punishments.278 However, such tenets are not reflective of
the ideals of decency that should be taught in public schools.279
Decency is a key pedagogical goal and moral aim of American
education,280 dating back to the earliest years of the United
States’ democracy.281 As a corollary to teaching decency and
guarding against the devolution of human behavior in order to
maintain order in schools, schools should ascribe to the belief
that “[i]f there are some punishments that are so barbaric that
they may not be imposed for the commission of crimes,
designated by our social system as the most thoroughly
reprehensible acts an individual can commit, then . . . similar
275
See Toni M. Massaro, Equality and Freedom of Expression: The Hate Speech
Dilemma, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 259 (1991) (discussing public schools’
“inculcation role and the importance [they play in] assimilating students into
cultural norms of civility and decency”).
276
Fedders & Langberg, supra note 156, at 956.
277
Marshall S. Shapo, In the Looking Glass: What Torts Scholarship Can Teach
Us About the American Experience, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1567, 1584 (1995).
278
See Kahan, Alternative Sanctions, supra note 67, at 636 (characterizing this
aspect of shaming in a positive way).
279
See NUSSBAUM, supra note 43, at 282 (“[A] decent society needs to go further,
finding ways to protect the dignity of its members against shame and stigma
through law.”); Mark A. Hall, Genetic Enhancement, Distributive Justice, and the
Goals of Medicine, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 669, 673 (2002) (describing public schools
as “a highly egalitarian system”).
280
See Lynn S. Brackman, Note, High Schools and the First Amendment: The
Eighth Circuit Leaves Students’ Rights at the Schoolhouse Gate, 66 MO. L. REV. 169,
177 (2001) (discussing American schools’ “responsibility to promote decency and
civility among [their] students”).
281
See Kate Strickland, Note, The School Finance Reform Movement, a History
and Prognosis: Will Massachusetts Join the Third Wave of Reform?, 32 B.C. L. REV.
1105, 1166 (1991) (describing a 1789 Massachusetts law that required schools to
teach “decent behavior” to help students “understand that virtues such as piety,
justice, industry and frugality would preserve and perfect the constitution, and
secure the blessing of liberty”).
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punishments may not be imposed . . . for . . . breaches of school
discipline.”282 Just as criminal law shaming should be discarded
under the decency critique, school shaming should be abandoned
under the same critique.283 The continued preservation of
decency as a core component of American public schools requires
no less, because “[a] decent society is one whose institutions do
not humiliate people.”284
3.

Moral-Educative Mission

School-shaming punishments are asymmetrical to the
fulfillment of a moral-educative mission, which is, perhaps, the
most central tenet of the pedagogical goals and civic aims of
American schools.285 Specific examples of school shaming that
harm the moral-educative mission in the school community
include strip searches, compelled apologies, dress code shaming
punishments, and restroom access denials.286 By examining how
school shaming violates the concept of a moral-educative mission,
it becomes clear the same concerns raised in critiques of criminal
law shaming are present in the evaluation of the validity of
shaming sanctions in schools.287 School-shaming penalties, like
their criminal equivalents, do not provide moral instruction or
education to the targeted student or the larger school community;
quite simply, they do not teach lessons regarding dignity,
decency, or any other positive, rights-recognitive moral values.288
Instead, school shaming teaches harmful notions of rights
282

Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 684 (1977) (White, J., dissenting).
See Susan H. Bitensky, The Poverty of Precedent for School Corporal
Punishment’s Constitutionality Under the Eighth Amendment, 77 U. CIN. L. REV.
1327, 1370 (2009) (discussing how incompatibility between a punishment and
standards of decency can be the basis for the invalidation of that punishment).
284
MARGALIT, supra note 101, at 1.
285
See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 373 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (“Schools are places where we inculcate the values
essential to the meaningful exercise of rights and responsibilities by a self-governing
citizenry.”); Andrew A. Cheng, The Inherent Hostility of Secular Public Education
Toward Religion: Why Parental Choice Best Serves the Core Values of the Religion
Clauses, 19 U. HAW. L. REV. 697, 759 (1997) (discussing how schools are charged
with providing “education that inculcates democratic values—the civic republican
virtues that will enable students to be citizens in society”).
286
See infra notes 291–316 and accompanying text.
287
Ann Monroe, Shame Solutions: How Shame Impacts School-Aged Children
and What Teachers Can Do To Help, 73 EDUC. F. 58, 62 (2009).
288
See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text.
283
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constriction, social homogeneity, and state control.289
Consequently, like the moral-educative mission critique of
criminal shaming, a commensurate critique of educational
shaming punishments supports the view that they should be
abandoned as disciplinary measures as they are violative of the
pedagogical imperative of fulfilling schools’ moral-educative
missions.290
Strip searches do not satisfy the school’s moral-educative
mission.291 The shame that results from the required and
nonconsensual exposure of students’ private body parts to adults
in a disciplinary strip search objectifies children292 and fails to
teach them about the sanctity of the body and core expectations
of bodily privacy.293 As Professor William Buss argues, “It would
be highly desirable if the citizens of the United States who are
now in school learn to value privacy, learn by the school’s
example that the society respects it, and learn that the courts
will protect it from invasion by governmental searches that
violate fourth amendment principles.”294 However, instead, the
lesson taught by strip searches is “an erosion of privacy and the
destruction of human values that go with privacy.”295 The
education that is imparted by strip search shaming punishments
289
See Amanda H. Cooley, Controlling Students and Teachers: The Increasing
Constriction of Constitutional Rights in Public Education, 66 BAYLOR L. REV. 235,
238 (2014) (discussing how the United States Supreme Court’s control discourse,
which has been capitalized upon by schools in the infliction of student punishments,
has resulted in the “dramatic curtailment of the scope of student constitutional
rights”).
290
See Sandra Day O’Connor, Foreword, The Rule of Law and Civic Education,
67 SMU L. REV. 693, 699 (2014) (“The first American public schools were founded
with this civic mission in mind, and throughout most of our Nation’s history, civic
education was prioritized.”).
291
Barry C. Feld, T.L.O. and Redding’s Unanswered (Misanswered) Fourth
Amendment Questions: Few Rights and Fewer Remedies, 80 MISS. L.J. 847, 943
(2011) (“In addition to the psychological trauma, a school official’s decision to strip
search a student conveys a moral message, teaches negative lessons about rights
and responsibilities, and strongly affects the student’s future relationship with
teachers and staff.”).
292
Highhouse v. Wayne Highlands Sch. Dist., 205 F. Supp. 3d 639, 647 (M.D.
Pa. 2016) (determining that school strip searches objectify students).
293
See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 374 (2009)
(finding that a student strip search violated “both subjective and reasonable societal
expectations of personal privacy”).
294
William G. Buss, The Fourth Amendment and Searches of Students in Public
Schools, 59 IOWA L. REV. 739, 792 (1974).
295
Id.
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is not one of dignity, decency, or any other positive moral value.
Because the use of strip searches in schools instructs children in
a way that contravenes the pedagogical mission of educating
them for participation in a democratic society that values dignity
and decency, these shaming practices must be eliminated from
schools.296
Forced apologies, as an example of an “induced-compliance
paradigm,” also do not serve the educative mission of schools.297
They are not an efficacious way to impart positive moral
positioning for students, as a true mea culpa cannot be forced by
an intermediary.298 Instead, “moral development and educational
theory suggest that the only way to effect consistent behavioral
change is by encouraging autonomous moral reasoning, wherein
wrongdoers come to appreciate the wrongfulness of their actions
more or less of their own accord . . . .”299 As Professor Brent
White has explained:
[I]ndividuals who apologize only when told to are operating at
Kohlberg’s “pre-conventional level” or Gilligan’s “self-interested
stage” of moral development, which refer [sic] to the level of
moral development of an average seven-year-old. Individuals at
the pre-conventional or self-interested stage have not developed
the capacity for moral reasoning based on the importance of
respecting conventional social norms, honoring higher ethical
principles, or fulfilling relational responsibilities. Rather, they
are simply responding to the threat of punishment or the
promise of reward without any principled understanding of why
the authority figure is asking them to behave in a certain way.
In the context of forced apology, such an individual might

296

See Scott A. Gartner, Note, Strip Searches of Students: What Johnny Really
Learned at School and How Local School Boards Can Help Solve the Problem, 70 S.
CAL. L. REV. 921, 943 (1997) (“[S]trip searches of children set[] a curious moral for
the nation’s youth.”).
297
White, supra note 234, at 1289.
298
See Frank Haldemann, Another Kind of Justice: Transitional Justice as
Recognition, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 675, 727 (2008) (“If the emotion of sorrow and
remorse is the ‘engine’ of apology, then the intervention of third parties or collective
actors seems somewhat antithetical to the apologetic act (which, typically, calls for
direct exchanges between the offender and the offended).”).
299
White, supra note 234, at 1290.
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refrain from the behavior that precipitated the forced apology as
long as the threat level was high enough. As soon as the
authority figures were out of the picture, however, he might
revert to the harmful behavior.300

What is even more problematic about forced apologies as
school-shaming punishments is that they are often required in
response to rights-protected behavior.301
So, even though
Professor Garvey, who generally disfavors criminal shaming,
endorses forced apology rituals as meeting the moral education
theory of criminal punishment, such endorsement is premised
upon an apology for an established violation of criminal law.302
In schools, typically, there has been no such establishment of
clear wrongdoing of this caliber. By compelling apologies to
effectuate shaming, school officials are, in fact, acting in direct
contravention of an education of morality; they are instead
“vitiating [the] moral force” of an effective apology and
eliminating ideals of dignity and decency.303 Consequently,
forced apologies should be eliminated from schools’ disciplinary
repertoires as they clash with the moral-educative mission of K12 schools.
Additionally, dress code shaming punishments undermine
the pedagogical goal of fulfilling schools’ moral-educative
mission.
As determined by Professor Harbach, “The
consequences of being ‘dress coded’ have a negative impact on
student learning and participation [with] . . . studies suggest[ing]
that a preoccupation with physical appearance based on
sexualized norms disrupts mental capacity and cognitive

300

Id. (footnotes omitted).
See Erwin Chemerinsky, Teaching That Speech Matters: A Framework for
Analyzing Speech Issues in Schools, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 825, 826 (2009)
(“[P]rotecting freedom of speech advances a core goal of school education: teaching
students about the Constitution and their rights. At the very least, there is
dissonance, if not hypocrisy, in teaching students that free speech matters when
school officials themselves provide virtually no protection for student speech.”).
302
See Garvey, Shaming Punishments, supra note 82, at 792–93 (discussing how
forced apologies can educate where there has been an unjustifiable violation and
established wrongdoing).
303
NICHOLAS TAVUCHIS, MEA CULPA: A SOCIOLOGY OF APOLOGY AND
RECONCILIATION 49 (1991) (“[A]n authentic apology cannot be delegated, consigned,
exacted, or assumed by the principals, no less outsiders, without totally altering its
meaning and vitiating its moral force.”).
301
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function.”304 Although all student learning is impacted by these
types of punishment and culture, dress code sanctions are
disproportionally meted out on girls, and with perhaps even more
force on girls of color,305 which results in missed instructional
time while being shamed and a lesson of indignity and indecency
for the witnessing community of schoolchildren.306
These
“[u]nequal results are unfair, and unfair procedures lead to
inequality,”307 which expressly conflicts with the pedagogical goal
to offer equal education to all public school students.308
Consequently, because these dress code shaming punishments
take away from the moral-educative mission of schools, they
should no longer be inflicted upon students.
Finally, restroom access denials that bar transgender
students from using the restroom that conforms with their
gender identity or that require transgender students to use a
restroom that is not used by other students damage the
pedagogical goal of fulfilling schools’ moral-educative mission.309
Although transgender youth are entitled to “non-disciplinary and
protected spaces in education,”310 students who are punished by
304
Harbach, supra note 243, at 1043–44 (citing AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, APA
TASK FORCE ON THE SEXUALIZATION OF GIRLS, REPORT OF THE APA TASK FORCE ON
THE SEXUALIZATION OF GIRLS 21 (2007), http://www.apa.org/pi/women/programs/girl
s/report-full.pdf).
305
See Ariel G. Siner, Comment, Dressing to Impress? A Legal Examination of
Dress Codes in Public Schools, 57 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 259, 260 (2017) (warning
that school dress codes perpetuate “archaic sexist standards”); MONIQUE W. MORRIS,
PUSHOUT: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF BLACK GIRLS IN SCHOOLS 184–85 (2016)
(discussing how dress code discipline often disproportionally targets African
American girls in schools).
306
See Harbach, supra note 243, at 1057 (outlining the missed learning
opportunities that result from school dress code shaming punishments and how
these disciplinary punishments are unequally inflicted on girls).
307
Jane Rutherford, The Myth of Due Process, 72 B.U. L. REV. 1, 74 (1992).
308
See Maurice R. Dyson, Promise Zones, Poverty, and the Future of Public
Schools: Confronting the Challenges of Socioeconomic Integration & School Culture
in High-Poverty Schools, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 711, 733 (arguing school-shaming
punishments “reinforce a ‘badge of inferiority’ that was at the crux of the Brown v.
Board of Education rationale in striking down segregation in public schools”).
309
See, e.g., Barbara Fedders, Coming Out for Kids: Recognizing, Respecting,
and Representing LGBTQ Youth, 6 NEV. L.J. 774, 790 (2006) (discussing the lessons
of indignity and indecency that are taught by transgender student restroom access
denials).
310
Neo Khuu, Comment, Obergefell v. Hodges: Kinship Formation, Interest
Convergence, and the Future of LGBTQ Rights, 64 UCLA L. REV. 184, 192 n.40
(2017).
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restroom access denials no longer have safe spaces for basic
human needs.311 Consequently, these students tend to withdraw
from the school community and miss valuable learning
opportunities,312 hampering their attainment of current and
future successes.313
By stigmatizing children with these
mandates, schools and their employees are educating the school
community that discrimination and ostracism based on gender
are acceptable.314 By engaging in restroom access denials,
schools are instructing cisgender students that anyone who is not
like them does not deserve basic rights of dignity, decency, or
legal protection.315 Such pernicious and detrimental pedagogy
erodes the basic moral-educative mission of public schools.316
Consequently, these restroom shaming mandates should no
longer be inflicted upon students.

311

See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Civil Rights Reform and the Body, 6 HARV. L. &
POL’Y REV. 201, 202 (2012) (discussing how the denial of basic bodily needs by civil
rights reform opponents is “a potent tool for preserving existing arrangements of
status and power”).
312
See Jennifer Levi & Daniel Redman, The Cross-Dressing Case for Bathroom
Equality, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 133, 137 (2010) (identifying restroom
discrimination as one of the leading causes of transgender students dropping out of
school).
313
See MINOW, supra note 255, at 27 (“[W]hen their identities are devalued in
the society, children know it, and that message damages their self-esteem and
ability to succeed.”).
314
See Evancho v. Pine-Richland Sch. Dist., 237 F. Supp. 3d 267, 294 (W.D. Pa.
2017) (noting in its finding of irreparable harm when transgender students are
barred access to gender-identity restrooms that “[c]ourts have long recognized that
disparate treatment itself stigmatizes members of a disfavored group as innately
inferior, and raises the ‘inevitable inference’ of animosity toward those impacted by
the involved classification”) (citation omitted); Aaron J. Curtis, Conformity or
Nonconformity? Designing Legal Remedies To Protect Transgender Students from
Discrimination, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 459, 473 (2016) (analyzing how transgender
student restroom access denials “might result in increased stigma and lead
transgender students to be further ostracized by the cisgender majority”).
315
See Yofi Tirosh & Michael Birnhack, Naked in Front of the Machine: Does
Airport Scanning Violate Privacy?, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1263, 1303 (2013) (citing Wolff,
supra note 311, at 231) (“Tobias Wolff argues that invoking a sense of shame and
bodily anxiety due to bodily differences has served as a rhetorical weapon by those
objecting to granting civil rights to discriminated groups such as blacks, gays, or
transgender people.”).
316
See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)
(“Consciously or otherwise, teachers . . . demonstrate the appropriate form of civil
discourse and political expression by their conduct and deportment in and out of
class.”).
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The examination of these school-shaming punishments
affirmatively gives rise to the same moral-educative concerns in
the critique of criminal shaming punishments.317 School shaming
fails to provide an appropriate, positive moral education of the
punished individual,318 which was at the core of Professor
Garvey’s opposition to criminal shaming.319 As even recognized
by Professor Kahan in his touchstone article on shaming, these
punishments do not guarantee an educative impact.320 In the K12 school context, shaming sanctions are inefficacious, “resulting
in significantly unequal punishment and inefficient deterrence”321
and teaching nothing of positive moral value, which contravenes
the core pedagogical value of a moral-educative mission of public
schools.322
School shaming also provides no positive moral education of
the surrounding community.323
Instead, these educational
punishments teach rights constriction, which was articulated as
an argument against criminal law shaming sanctions by
Professor Schulhofer.324 When schools inflict shaming, they are
not abiding by their moral obligation “to ‘teach by example’ by
avoiding symbolic measures that diminish constitutional
protections.”325 This aspect of harmful state control,326 along with

317

See supra notes 137–152 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Clarke, supra note 127, at 20–21 (discussing the lack of educative
effect of shaming).
319
See supra notes 140–142 and accompanying text; see also Rosenblatt, supra
note 22, at 17 (arguing criminal shaming’s popularity “waned in the nineteenth
century, likely due in part to the influence of the Quakers—who advocated for
rehabilitative and educative punishment”).
320
See Kahan, Alternative Sanctions, supra note 67, at 636 (noting that not all
punished individuals will view their conduct as equally shameful as the punisher).
321
Alex Geisinger, A Group Identity Theory of Social Norms and Its
Implications, 78 TUL. L. REV. 605, 649 (2004).
322
See Jason M. Solomon, Civil Recourse as Social Equality, 39 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 243, 270–71 (2011) (arguing public schools should “treat[] and engage[] people
as moral agents”).
323
See Jamila Jefferson-Jones, A Good Name: Applying Regulatory Takings
Analysis to Reputational Damage Caused by Criminal History, 116 W. VA. L. REV.
497, 521 (2013) (discussing how shaming teaches the community to isolate and
stigmatize the punished individual).
324
See NUSSBAUM, supra note 43, at 236–37.
325
Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 855 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
326
See Justin R. Chapa, Comment, Stripped of Meaning: The Supreme Court
and the Government as Educator, 2011 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 127, 168 (describing
school dress codes as a form of highly-restrictive social control).
318
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a focus on social homogeneity,327 is conveyed with each
administration of school shaming—issues identified by Professor
Nussbaum as reasons for the invalidation of criminal shaming.328
These concerns are even more problematic in K-12 schools, given
that the school disciplinary process is not “a totally accurate,
unerring process, never mistaken and never unfair,” which was
recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Goss v.
Lopez.329 Also, the use of shaming against targeted minority or
other marginalized students instructs the greater school
community that it is normal and appropriate to discriminate
against and stigmatize students based on these differences.330
This contravenes the obligations of schools to convey civic
education to prepare students to participate in a liberal
democracy of diverse citizens.331
In sum, school-shaming punishments do not teach lessons of
dignity, decency, or any other positive civic values,332 which are
core components of the moral-educative mission of American
public schools.333 This lack of moral-educative efficacy was a
327
See Gustafson, supra note 54, at 344 (discussing the centrifugal effects of
shaming, as it pushes already marginalized individuals “farther to the margins”).
328
See NUSSBAUM, supra note 43, at 232.
329
419 U.S. 565, 579–80 (1975) (noting that “[d]isciplinarians, although
proceeding in utmost good faith, frequently act on the reports and advice of others;
and the controlling facts and the nature of the conduct under challenge are often
disputed. The risk of error is not at all trivial, and it should be guarded against if
that may be done without prohibitive cost or interference with the educational
process”).
330
See, e.g., Michael J. Higdon, To Lynch a Child: Bullying and Gender
Nonconformity in Our Nation’s Schools, 86 IND. L.J. 827, 847 (2011) (discussing
educators’ complicity in the bullying of gender nonconforming students by their
peers based on their discriminatory treatment of those students).
331
See Ronald C. Den Otter, Can a Liberal Take His Own Side in an Argument?
The Case for John Rawls’s Idea of Political Liberalism, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 319, 344
(2005) (“Any conception of civic education, which would be appropriate for a morally
pluralistic society such as our own, would have to strike a more appropriate balance
between tolerance for different ways of life and cultivation of the skills and virtues
that make good citizenship possible in a liberal democracy.”); Martha Minow, After
Brown: What Would Martin Luther King Say?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 599, 640
(2008) (discussing the important roles schools play in conveying civic values to
prepare students for “self-governance in a diverse society”).
332
See Sharon Lamb, The Psychology of Condemnation: Underlying Emotions
and Their Symbolic Expression in Condemning and Shaming, 68 BROOK. L. REV.
929, 954 (2003) (arguing that shaming demonstrates “that the world is very, very
unsafe”).
333
See Susan J. Becker, The Immorality of Publicly Outing Private People, 73
OR. L. REV. 159, 219 (1994) (“Virtually every school of morality embraces the
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central part of the opposition of Professors Markel and Massaro
to the use of shaming in the criminal justice system.334
Consequently, like the scholarly rejection of criminal shaming
punishments on the basis of their failure to fulfill a moraleducative mission, educational shaming punishments should be
rejected as they fail to meet the key pedagogical goal of moral
education in American schools.
School discipline “must work to support the educational
mission of the school.”335 However, shaming does scant to
educate.336 The humiliation of shaming young children is not “a
sound means of” inculcating social norms or preparing students
to participate in a society that values dignity and decency.337
Egalitarianism is certainly being abandoned by school-shaming
punishments as they tend to target the most vulnerable and
marginalized groups in schools—students of color, female
students, effeminate male students, and transgender students.338
Instead, as Professor Markel argued, “The liberal way of life
requires an education of citizens that appreciates the importance
and order of individual freedom, moral responsibility, and respect
for the procedures that guarantee a well-ordered polity.”339 In
order to fulfill this moral-educative mission, schools must teach
the core civic values of dignity, decency, and respect and

principle that all people should be accorded equal dignity . . . .”); E. Gary Spitko, A
Reform Agenda Premised upon the Reciprocal Relationship Between Anti-LGBT Bias
in Role Model Occupations and the Bullying of LGBT Youth, 48 CONN. L. REV. 71, 77
(2015) (discussing teachers’ role-modeling function in the instillation of core societal
values in school children).
334
See Massaro, Shame, Culture, supra note 45, at 1884.
335
Rokeach & Denvir, supra note 215, at 288.
336
See Garvey, Shaming Punishments, supra note 82, at 784 (discussing the
lack of educative effect of shaming).
337
Massaro, Shame, Culture, supra note 45, at 1930.
338
See Whitman, supra note 96, at 1064 (arguing shaming sanctions are
“inflicted only on certain, peculiarly vulnerable classes” of people).
339
Markel, Shaming Punishments, supra note 21, at 2226.
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recognition of rights.340 This will require a termination of schoolshaming punishments, as they are antithetical in every way to a
virtuous, moral education.341
4.

Conclusion

Shaming punishments should no longer be implemented in
schools, just as they should no longer be implemented in criminal
law, as they violate principles of dignity, decency, and core civic
value education. School “shaming punishments communicate
brashly and unequivocally [with] . . . clear meaning and visible
bite.”342 This clear meaning of these shaming punishments does
not jibe with the pedagogical and moral aims of the American
educational
system.343
Consequently,
school-shaming
punishments should be rejected based on the same theoretical
principles of the criminal shaming critique.

340
See PETER BERKOWITZ, VIRTUE AND THE MAKING OF MODERN LIBERALISM xi
(1999) (discussing how these virtues “do not arise spontaneously but require
education and cultivation”); Kevin J. Worthen, One Small Step for Courts, One Giant
Leap for Group Rights: Accommodating the Associational Role of “Intimate”
Government Entities, 71 N.C. L. REV. 595, 614 (1993) (“[P]ublic schools can and
ought to teach the values of civic virtue . . . .”).
341
See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (stating
schools have the duty to “inculcate the habits and manners of civility”); New Jersey
v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 354 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“It would be
incongruous and futile to charge teachers with the task of embuing their students
with an understanding of our system of constitutional democracy, while at the same
time immunizing those same teachers from the need to respect constitutional
protections.”); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979) (stating the objective of
public education is the “inculcat[ion of] fundamental values necessary to the
maintenance of a democratic political system”).
342
Stephanos Bibas, Essay, Transparency and Participation in Criminal
Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 948–49 (2006).
343
Lia B. Epperson, True Integration: Advancing Brown’s Goal of Educational
Equity in the Wake of Grutter, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 175, 217 (2005) (“[T]he
fundamental goal of elementary and secondary education is to prepare children to be
good citizens, which includes instilling civic values and developing strong social
skills.”).
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CONCLUSION
If “[t]he law’s objective is to deter as much harm as possible
while imposing the fewest costs,”344 and shaming in legal contexts
is only of utility when the benefits outweigh the costs,345 then
shaming is certainly not an appropriate mechanism to punish
schoolchildren for the violation—or suspected violation—of school
rules, policies, and norms. The harm is too great; the costs are
too high; and the benefit is nil. Shaming’s dissonance with the
pedagogical aims of the school environment should end its use in
K-12 schools.346
Educators should reject such disciplinary
methods, as applied to predominantly minor schoolchildren in a
tutelary environment, under a philosophical lens, just as
preeminent scholars have rejected shaming sanctions for adults
in the criminal justice system.347 School shaming runs counter to
dignity, decency, and schools’ institutional, moral-educative
mission, which demonstrates how it is not reflective of the
“think” perspective of “a set of techniques aimed at fostering the
best conditions for arriving at collective societal preference.”348
Therefore, shaming punishments must be abandoned as a school
disciplinary method, because they clash with the core
pedagogical and moral aims of American public education.349
Compared to criminal shaming, the rejection of these
sanctions is easier in the school context, as they do not require
their exchange for the equally harmful measures of exclusionary
344

Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Innovation and Incarceration:
An Economic Analysis of Criminal Intellectual Property Law, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 275,
284 (2014).
345
See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and
Social Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1603, 1618 (2000).
346
See, e.g., Jason P. Nance, Random, Suspicionless Searches of Students’
Belongings: A Legal, Empirical, and Normative Analysis, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 367,
398 (2013) (“If schools do not honor students’ constitutional rights, schools cannot
effectively teach students about those rights.”).
347
See supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text; see also NUSSBAUM, supra
note 43, at 230.
348
Ryan Calo, Essay, Code, Nudge, or Notice?, 99 IOWA L. REV. 773, 798 n.168
(2014) (citing PETER JOHN ET AL., NUDGE, NUDGE, THINK, THINK: EXPERIMENTING
WITH WAYS TO CHANGE CIVIC BEHAVIOUR 13–14 (2011)).
349
See Erica Frankenberg & Liliana M. Garces, The Use of Social Science
Evidence in Parents Involved and Meredith: Implications for Researchers and
Schools, 46 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 703, 729 (2008) (discussing schools’ “unique
mission of preparing students for the duties of citizenship in our diverse, pluralistic
nation”).
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or corporal punishment.350
In K-12 schools, there is “an
expressively viable alternative sanction,”351 in the form of
disciplinary measures that incorporate positive behavioral
strategies. School discipline can and should incorporate the basic
tenets of dignity, decency, and moral-educative mission.352 These
are all steps in the right direction to achieve the aim of “a wellTherefore, shaming should also be
educated citizenry.”353
rejected in the K-12 school environment under any of the
philosophical critiques of criminal shaming354—dignity, decency,
and a moral-educative mission—which all shape the core
pedagogical foundation of American education.355

350
See, e.g., Garvey, Shaming Punishments, supra note 82, at 760 (“If the
alternative to [criminal] shame is imprisonment, then at worst, shame simply
substitutes one set of indignities for another.”); Whitman, supra note 96, at 1058
(discussing how shaming punishments are no crueler than incarceration).
351
Kahan, Shaming Sanctions, supra note 78, at 2080 (noting how the rejection
of criminal shaming “would result in the certainty of the even greater evils of
imprisonment: the default punishment in the absence of an expressively viable
alternative sanction”).
352
See Rokeach & Denvir, supra note 215, at 277 (arguing for “a new approach
to school discipline based on the constitutional value of human dignity”).
353
Stell v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 860 F. Supp. 1563, 1585 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (“[A]
strong educational system is essential in preparing our children to meet the
demands of an increasingly sophisticated world, and in enabling them to be
productive, responsible and thoughtful citizens who may in turn contribute to the
community in which they live.”).
354
See Alon Harel, Why Only the State May Inflict Criminal Sanctions: The
Argument from Moral Burdens, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2629, 2645 (2007) (discussing
how shaming punishment theory exemplifies that these sanctions are “not merely
theoretical”).
355
See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (defining the U.S. public school
system as “a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic system
of government”); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 79 (1979) (discussing how schools
teach students “citizen’s social responsibilities” which is “crucial to the continued
good health of a democracy”).

